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ABSTRACT 
T h i s  paper  p rov ides  background i n f o r m a t i o n  about  World Bank bor- 
rowing and l e n d i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  and about  U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  
Bank. Among o t h e r  m a t t e r s ,  i t  d i s c u s s e s  where t h e  World Bank borrows 
i t s  f u n d s ,  t h e  amounts c o n t r i b u t e d  by t h e  United S t a t e s  and o t h e r  
c o u n t r i e s ,  and changes  i n  World Bank p r i o r i t i e s  and l o a n  p o l i c y .  
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EIGHTEEN QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE WORLD BANK 
OVERVIEW: SOME BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
ON THE WORLD BANK 
The World Bank i s  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agency which f i n a n c e s  develop-  
ment a c t i v i t i e s  i n  low-income c o u n t r i e s  us ing money borrowed i n  i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  o r  c o n t r i b u t e d  by t h e  governments o f  more 
developed c o u n t r i e s .  The Bank was founded,  a l o n g  wi th  t h e  I n t e r n a -  
t i o n a l  Monetary Fund, fo l lowing  t h e  1944 i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic con- 
f e r e n c e  a t  B r e t t o n  Woods, New Hampshire. The Bank was i n t e n d e d  t o  b e  
a major i n s t r u m e n t  f o r  promoting i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic c o o p e r a t i o n ,  
long-term balanced g rowth ,  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i t y .  
Over t h e  y e a r s ,  i t  h a s  made v a r i o u s  changes  i n  i t s  o p e r a t i o n s  and pro- 
c e d u r e s  a s  i t  h a s  sought  t o  pursue  t h e s e  g o a l s  i n  a changing economic 
environment .  
The World Bank h a s  grown s u b s t a n t i a l l y  s i n c e  i t  began l o a n  opera -  
t i o n s  i n  1947. From 44 member c o u n t r i e s  a t  t h e  t i m e  -- most i n  Western 
Europe and t h e  Americas -- t h e  Bank 's  membership h a s  grown t o  149 
c o u n t r i e s .  I n  1985,  t h e  Bank approved 236 l o a n s  t o t a l l i n g  $14.4 b i l -  
l i o n  t o  8 3  c o u n t r i e s .  F i g u r e  l shows t h e  growth o f  World Bank l e n d i n g  
s i n c e  1947. 
The World Bank o p e r a t e s  th rough  t h r e e  a f f i l i a t e s  ( o r ,  a s  some 
would s a y ,  t h r e e  l o a n  windows). The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Bank f o r  Reconst r -  
u c t i o n  and Development (IBRD), t h e  o r i g i n a l  World Bank, l o a n s  money 
F igure  1. Annual IBRO and IDA Lending, 1947-1985 
( m i  11 ions o f  US d o l l a r  equ iva len t )  
( S o u r c e :  World Bank) 
a t  near-commercial i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  ma in ly  t o  middle-income n a t i o n s .  
The second a f f i l i a t e ,  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F inance  Corpora t ion  ( I F C ) ,  
which was founded i n  1956,  makes l o a n s  and e q u i t y  i n v e s t m e n t s  t o  
l o c a l  p r i v a t e l y  owned f i r m s  i n  deve lop ing  c o u n t r i e s ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  
h e l p  s t r e n g t h e n  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  growth.  I t  i s  run a s  a  semi-auton- 
omous body, w i t h  i t s  own managing v i c e  p r e s i d e n t  and a  s e p a r a t e  
s t a f f .  The t h i r d  a f f i l i a t e ,  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Development Associa-  
t i o n  (IDA), which was founded i n  1960, makes c o n c e s s i o n a l  (no- 
i n t e r e s t )  l o a n s  t o  t h e  w o r l d ' s  p o o r e s t  c o u n t r i e s .  The IBRD and I D A  
a r e  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  channel  f o r  World Bank a s s i s t a n c e  t o  deve lop ing  
c o u n t r i e s .  A s  a  p r a c t i c a l  m a t t e r ,  t h e y  o p e r a t e  a s  though t h e y  were 
a  s i n g l e  agency wi th  two "checkbooks ," two s e p a r a t e  l o a n  a c c o u n t s .  
They s h a r e  a  common management, s t a f f ,  o p e r a t i n g  p o l i c i e s ,  and f a c i l -  
i t i e s .  They accounted f o r  94 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  World Bank's t o t a l  a i d  
canmitments  i n  1985, whi le  t h e  IFC accounted f o r  6  pe rcen t  of  Bank 
commitments t h a t  y e a r .  Th i s  paper  f o c u s e s ,  f o r  t h e  most p a r t ,  o n  
i s s u e s  which r e l a t e  t o  t h e  I B R D  and I D A .  
In a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  World Bank, t h e r e  a r e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  develop-  
ment banks f o r  a l l  t h e  major  deve lop ing  r e g i o n s  of t h e  world.  These 
a r e  the  Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) , founded i n  1959, t h e  
Af r i can  Developnent Bank (AFDB), founded i n  1964, and t h e  Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), founded i n  1966. Like t h e  World Bank, e a c h  
r e g i o n a l  development bank a l s o  h a s  a  nea r -marke t  r a t e  window (which 
l e n d s  what t h e  banks c a l l  " o r d i n a r y  c a p i t a l " )  and a  c o n c e s s i o n a l - r a t e  
window f o r  a i d  t o  t h e  n e e d i e s t  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e i r  r e g i o n s .  The 
World Bank i s  t h e  l a r g e s t  and most i n f l u e n t i a l  of t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  
banks .  In 1985,  f o r  example,  t h e  I B R D  provided 66 pe rcen t  o f  t h e  
near-market  r a t e  l o a n s  and t h e  I D A  p rov ided  over  69  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  
c o n c e s s i o n a l  l o a n s  l e n t  by a l l  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks .  
The World Bank and t h e  o t h e r  m u l t i l a t e r a l  a g e n c i e s  a r e  organ- 
i z e d  l i k e  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  Voting power i s  e i g h t e d  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  
e a c h  c o u n t r y ' s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  ( o r  s u b s c r i p t i o n  t o  c a p i t a l  s t o c k . )  
The World Bank i s  headed by a  p r e s i d e n t ,  who manages day-to-day 
o p e r a t i o n s  and s u p e r v i s e s  t h e  approx imate ly  6 ,200 i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  who comprise  t h e  Bank s t a f f .  The p r e s i d e n t  i s  e l e c t e d  
f o r  a  f ive -year  term by t h e  Bank 's  Board of Execut ive  D i r e c t o r s ,  a  
21 member panel  appo in ted  o r  e l e c t e d  by t h e  member c o u n t r i e s .  By 
t r a d i t i o n ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  nominates  t h e  World Bank p r e s i d e n t  w h i l e  
t h e  Europeans name t h e  head o f  t h e  L n t e r n a t i o n a l  Monetary Fund. The 
e x e c u t i v e  board mee t s  i n  con t inuous  s e s s i o n  t o  o v e r s e e  Bank o p e r a t i o n s  
and make a l l  f i n a l  l o a n  d e c i s i o n s .  The United S t a t e s  i s  t h e  l a r g e s t  
s i n g l e  c o n t r i b u t o r  and ,  t o g e t h e r  wi th  t h e  4 o t h e r  l a r g e s t  s t o c k h o l d e r s ,  
i t  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  a p p o i n t  i t s  own r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  on t h e  Bank execu- 
t i v e  b o a r d .  The s m a l l e r  s t o c k h o l d e r s  form group ings  t o  e l e c t  t h e  
o t h e r  16 e x e c u t i v e  d i r e c t o r s ,  The number o f  v o t e s  each e x e c u t i v e  
d i r e c t o r  c a s t s  will depend on t h e  number o f  v o t e s  possessed by t h e  
c o u n t r y  o r  c o u n t r i e s  which named him. The Bank's  Board of Governors 
normal ly  mee t s  once  a  yea r  a t  t h e  annual  m e e t i n g ,  l i k e  s t o c k h o l d e r s ,  
t o  r ev iew Bank o p e r a t i o n s ,  d i s c u s s  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s i t u a t i o n ,  and 
e l e c t  e x e c u t i v e  d i r e c t o r s  a s  t h e i r  terms of  o f f i c e  e x p i r e .  Each 
c o u n t r y  h a s  one r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  on t h e  Board of Governors -- u s u a l l y  
t h e  F inance  M i n i s t e r  o r  Treasury  S e c r e t a r y  -- who c a s t s  whatever num- 
b e r  o f  v o t i n g  s h a r e s  h i s  c o u n t r y  p o s s e s s e s .  
No s i n g l e  c o u n t r y  c o n t r o l s  t h e  World Bank, a l t h o u g h  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  and t h e  o t h e r  advanced i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s  a l l  have subs tan-  
t i a l  i n f l u e n c e  w i t h i n  i t .  D e c i s i o n s  on t h e  Bank's  e x e c u t i v e  b o a r d  
a r e  u s u a l l y  made on a  consensus  b a s i s ,  f o l l o w i n g  a  d i s c u s s i o n  which 
a i r s  t h e  r e l e v a n t  v i e w  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s .  The Board may 
t a k e  a  formal v o t e  i f  no consensus  emerges from i t s  d e l i b e r a t i o n s .  
I n f l u e n c e  i n  t h o s e  d e l i b e r a t i o n s  i s  c l o s e l y  l i n k e d  t o  c o u n t r y  v o t i n g  
s h a r e s .  The t o p  f i v e  s t o c k h o l d e r s  (Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  J a p a n ,  Germany, 
United Kingdom, and France)  have  4 3 . 3  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  v o t e  i n  t h e  
IBRD and 4 4 . 7  p e r c e n t  i n  t h e  IDA. Together  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  members 
o f  t h e  O r g a n i z a t i o n  f o r  Economic Coopera t ion  and Development (OECD) , 
t h e  advanced i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s  have 6 3 . 7  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  v o t e  i n  
t h e  I B R D  and 6 3 . 2  p e r c e n t  i n  t h e  I D A .  
The funding a r rangements  f o r  t h e  I B R D  and i t s  two a f f i l i a t e s ,  
t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Development A s s o c i a t i o n  (IDA), and t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
F inance  C o r p o r a t i o n  ( IFC) d i f f e r  . The IBRD o p e r a t e s  m a i n l y  u s i n g  
funds  borrowed on world c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  and backed by t h e  Bank ' s  
g e n e r a l  c r e d i t w o r t h i n e s s  and by t h e  s u b s c r i p t i o n s  o f  i t s  member coun- 
t r i e s .  From t i m e  t o  t i m e ,  t h e  IBRD's members meet t o  d i s c u s s  p o s s i b l e  
i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  Bank's  c a p i t a l  s t o c k .  During t h e s e  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  
i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  s e t t l i n g  t h e  s i z e  and t e r n s  o f  t h e  c a p i t a l  e x p a n s i o n ,  
t h e  member c o u n t r i e s  a l s o  d i s c u s s  c o u n t r y  s h a r e s ,  l o a n  and o p e r a t i n g  
p o l i c i e s ,  and o t h e r  r e l e v a n t  i s s u e s .  U n t i l  r e c e n t l y ,  c o u n t r i e s  sub- 
s c r i b e d  t o  new I B R D  c a p i t a l  s t o c k  by  paying 1 0  p e r c e n t  o f  i t s  v a l u e  
i n  pa id - in  c a p i t a l  and t h e  o t h e r  9 0  p e r c e n t  i n  c a l l a b l e  c a p i t a l .  ( I n  
t h e  l a s t  c a p i t a l  i n c r e a s e ,  t h e  pa id - in  p o r t i o n  f e l l  t o  7 . 5  p e r c e n t . )  
Pa id - in  c a p i t a l  i s  t h e  p o r t i o n  o f  a  c o u n t r y ' s  s u b s c r i p t i o n  which i t  
r a n i t s  t o  t h e  Bank a t  t h e  t ime  i t  s u b s c r i b e s  i t s  s h a r e s .  C a l l a b l e  
c a p i t a l  i s  t h e  p o r t i o n  which t h e  c o u n t r y  a g r e e s  t o  r e m i t  i f  t h e  Bank 
c a l l s  f o r  i t s  payment. The Bank c a n  c a l l  on t h i s  c a l l a b l e  c a p i t a l  
o n l y  i f  i t  needs  t h e  f u n d s  t o  meet i t s  o b l i g a t i o n s  t o  i t s  own 
c r e d i t o r s .  
Because t h e  IDA i s  a  c o n c e s s i o n a l  l o a n  program, i t  n e e d s  
d i r e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from member c o u n t r i e s  -- r a t h e r  t h a n  bor rowings  
on commercial m a r k e t s  -- t o  fund i t s  o p e r a t i o n s .  The donor  c o u n t r i e s  
meet e v e r y  t h r e e  y e a r s  t o  n e g o t i a t e  new r e p l e n i s h m e n t s  of  IDA'S 
f u n d s .  The s i z e  o f  t h e  r e p l e n i s h m e n t  and t h e  s h a r e s  f o r  each  donor  
a r e  m a t t e r s  f o r  n e g o t i a t i o n .  A s  a t  t h e  I B R D  t a l k s ,  c o u n t r i e s  o f t e n  
p r e s s  f o r  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  o p e r a t i o n a l  o r  p o l i c y  i s s u e s  d u r i n g  t h e  
c o u r s e  o f  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n s  . 
The IFC o p e r a t e s  p a r t l y  wi th  funds  c o n t r i b u t e d  d i r e c t l y  b y  i t s  
member c o u n t r i e s  b u t  ma in ly  wi th  f u n d s  borrowed from t h e  I B R D .  ( I n  
f i s c a l  1986,  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e ,  i t  a l s o  borrowed on two o c c a s i o n s  
d i r e c t l y  on p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  marke t s  .) The member c o u n t r i e s  have  m e t  
t h r e e  t i m e s  (1955,  1977,  and 1982) t o  n e g o t i a t e  e x p a n s i o n s  o f  IFC 
c a p i t a l  s t o c k .  A s  wi th  I D A  r e p l e n i s h m e n t s ,  IFC c a p i t a l  e x p a n s i o n s  
i n v o l v e  d i r e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o f  funds  paid  i n  from t h e  member's 
t r e a s u r i e s .  
I. WORLD BANK BORROWING ACTIVITIES 
/ Question 1. 
Where does the World Bank obtain get the money it lends? 
The IBRD has three main sources of income which it can use to 
finance its loans: borrowings, net income, and subscriptions of 
usable paid-in capital. Historically, usable paid-in subscriptions 
have accounted for about 5 percent, earnings for about 8 percent, 
and borrowings for about 87 percent of the World Bank's available 
funds. As of December 31, 1985, borrowings since inception totalled 
$61.5 billion, reserves (mainly retained earnings) and other accumu- 
lated income totalled $5.8 billion, and subscriptions of freely usable 
paid-in capital totalled $3.6 billion. (Countries pay part of their 
paid-in subscriptions in foreign exchange and part in their own cur- 
rencies. For many LDCs, the part subscribed in their own currencies 
cannot be used for loans to other countries.) 
In the early years of the IBRD's history, a good portion of its 
disbursements were financed using paid-in capital. In recent years, 
however, the Bank has relied on borrowing and income from other 
sources. Table 1 (next page) shows that IBRD loan disbursements have 
actually been smaller than new borrowings in all but one of the 
past five years. 
Question 2: 
How much does the World Bank borrow each year? 
How large is the World Bank's outstanding debt? 
Borrowings. The World Bank is a major multi-currency borrower 
in world capital markets. Figure 2 (page 6) shows the amounts the 
IBRD has borrowed during the last five years. Its borrowings went 
from $5.7 billion in 1981 to $13.8 billion in 1985, a 142 percent 
increase. 
The Bank reports that it plans to borrow around $10.6 billion 
on a mediumand long-term basis and another $650 million on a short- 
term basis in fiscal 1986. The Bank also plans to refinance its 
$3.45 billion in existing shortterm obligations. The Bank says that, 
in fiscal 1987, it will borrow about $10 billion more on a short- or 
long-term basis. 
The amount the Bank needs to borrow is closely related to the 
amount it expects to disburse. In fiscal 1982, the Bank disbursed 
$6.37 billion, while in fiscal 1985 it disbursed nearly $8.87 bil- 
lion on its outstanding loan commitments. (It expects to disburse 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































F i g u r e  2.  Volume and Type o f  Wor l d  Bank 
Bor row ings ,  1981-1985 
( m i l l i o n s  o f  US d o l l a r  e q u i v a l e n t )  Ref  i nanc  i n g  
( O f f i c i a l  I 
and P r i v a t e )  I , 
O f f  i c i a  
(New) 
P r i v a t e  
S e c t  o r  (New) 
O f f i c i a l  7 
( f i x e d  r a t e )  I 
I 
I I 
P r i v a t e  I ," 
S e c t o r  I S  
( v a r i a b l e )  I , 
P r i v a t e  1 E 3
S e c t  o r  16 
( f i x e d  r a t e )  I g 
I 
PI PROGRAM FOR ' RFFINANCING OF SHORT- 
MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM SHORT-TEW NEW BORROWINGS TEW BORROWINGS 
p r i v a t e  S e c t o r  O f f i c i a l  Total I P r i v a t e  O f f i c i a l  T o t a l  1 T o t a l  Of which 1 P r i v a t e  O f f i c i a l  T o t a l  
( f i x e d  r a t e ) ( v a r i a b l e )  ( f i x e d )  I S e c t o r  1 Cur Swaps 1 S e c t o r  
I I- I - I 
( S o u r c e :  World Bank F i n a n c i a l  O p e r a t i o n s  Depar tment )  
m i t m e n t s  i n c r e a s e d ,  meanwhi l e ,  from $ 1 0 . 3 3  b i l l i o n  i n  1982 t o  abou t  
$11 .36  b i l l i o n  i n  1985.  
The Bank h a s  r e c e n t l y  u n v e i l e d  a  p l a n  t o  a lmos t  d o u b l e  i t s  a n n u a l  
volume o f  l o a n  c m i t m e n t s  by  1990. An i n c r e a s e  i n  l o a n  commitments  
d o e s  n o t  mean t h e  l e v e l  of  d i s b u r s e m e n t s  will i n c r e a s e  r i g h t  away,  a s  
t h e  Bank o n l y  d i s b u r s e s  f u n d s  a s  t h e  m r k  on i t s  p r o j e c t s  p r o g r e s s e s  
and t h e  b i l l s  from t h e  c o n t r a c t o r s  c a n e  d u e .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  more  com- 
m i t m e n t s  mean more d i s b u r e m e n t s  a t  some f u t u r e  d a t e .  I f  t h i s  p a t t e r n  
o f  growing commitment and d i s b u r s e m e n t  l e v e l s  c o n t i n u e s ,  t h e  Bank w i l l  
need t o  b o r r o w  l a r g e r  sums i n  f u t u r e  y e a r s .  Many a n a l y s t s  c o n t e n d  
t h a t  a  m a j o r  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  volume o f  World Bank l e n d i n g  i s  n e c e s s a r y ,  
g i v e n  t h e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  world f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m .  Some c r i t i c s  m a i n t a i n ,  
t h o u g h ,  t h a t  t h e  World Bank i s  a l r e a d y  t o o  l a r g e  and t h i s  i n c r e a s e  i n  
l e n d i n g  shou ld  n o t  take  p l a c e .  I f  t h e  volume o f  Bank d i s b u r s e m e n t s  
r e m a i n s  t h e  same o r  i f  i t  d e c l i n e s  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  ( a  l e s s  l i k e l y  even-  
t u a l i t y , )  t h e  amount of  World Bank bo r rowing  would a l s o  d e c l i n e .  
Outstanding deb t .  Table 2  shows t h e  World Bank's t o t a l  ou ts tand-  
ing debt  and annual i n t e r e s t  payments f o r  each year from 1981 t o  1985. 
Bank's t o t a l  deb t  i nc reased -du r ing  t h i s  per iod from $27.8 b i l l i o n  
t o  $50.2 b i l l i o n ,  an 80 percent  r i s e .  
Table  2. World Bank Outstanding Debt, 1981-5 
( m i l l i o n s  of  U.S. d o l l a r s  equ iva l en t )  
1981 - 1982 1983 1984 1985 
s h o r t  term borrowings ---- ---- 1,488 2,721 3,450 
medium & long-term 
borrowings 27,757 31,761 38,065 42,294 46,791 
t o t a l  ou t s t and ing  27,757 31,761 39,553 45,015 50,241 
annual i n t e r e s t  c o s t  
o f  t h i s  deb t  2,104 2,423 3,085 3,638 3,933 
(Source: World Bank annual r e p o r t s ,  r e l e v a n t  yea r s )  
I Question 3: 
I I 
I How much does t h e  World Bank borrow from governments ( i nc lud -  I 
I i ng  c e n t r a l  banks) compared t o  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  markets?  1 
I 
In  r ecen t  y e a r s ,  t h e  World Bank has  expanded i t s  borrowing f r a n  
bo th  o f f i c i a l  (government) and p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  sources .  F igure  3  
shows t h a t  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  has  been t h e  l a r g e s t  source o f  money 
f inanc ing  IBRD o p e r a t i o n s .  As F igure  2  (page 6) i n d i c a t e s ,  t h e  bu lk  
of t h i s  p r i v a t e  money has  been borrowed a t  medium- and long-term f ixed  
r a t e s ,  a l though t h e  amount borrowed on a  short-term b a s i s  o r  a t  v a r i -  
a b l e  r a t e s  has  increased s i g n i f i c a n t l y  of  l a t e .  
F i g u r e  3. Wor ld Bank Bor row ing  f rom O f f i c i a l  
and P r i v a t e  Sources, 1981-1985 
( m i l l i o n s  o f  US d o l l a r  e q u i v a l e n t )  
14000 T 
O f f i c i a l  
Sources 
@ P r i v a t e  
Sect  o r  
Sources 
1961 1902 1983 1984 1985 
(Source : r e c a l c u l a t e d  f r an  d a t a  a s s o c i a t e d  with Figure 2 )  
F i g u r e  4 shows t h e  l e v e l  and " n a t i o n a l i t y "  of  World Bank borrow- 
i n g  from o f f i c i a l  s o u r c e s .  'Ihe World Bank once  d e r i v e d  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  
p o r t i o n  o f  i t s  borrowings  from c e n t r a l  banks i n  many c o u n t r i e s .  Now, 
however,  w h i l e  c e n t r a l  banks a r e  s t i l l  an impor tan t  s o u r c e  of  funds ,  
o t h e r  s o u r c e s  have become i n c r e a s i n g l y  s i g n i f i c a n t .  The Bank of Japan 
and t h e  Bundesbank ( t h e  West German c e n t r a l  bank) -- major  s o u r c e s  i n  
p rev ious  y e a r s  -- have become l e s s  s u b s t a n t i a l  l e n d e r s  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s .  
By c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  World Bank's  new C e n t r a l  Bank F a c i l i t y  -- a  World Bank 
borrowing program c r e a t e d  i n  1984 -- h a s  become a  major s o u r c e  of f u n d s .  
Unl ike  t h e  Bank's  o t h e r  borrowings  from c e n t r a l  banks,  which invo lved  
f i x e d  amounts l e n t  over  s e t  p e r i o d s  o f  t i m e ,  t h e  C e n t r a l  Bank F a c i l i t y  
p e r m i t s  c o u n t r i e s  t o  l end  U.S. d o l l a r s  from t h e i r  f o r e i g n  exchange 
r e s e r v e s  t o  t h e  Bank whi le  s t i l l  having l i q u i d  a c c e s s  ( t h e i r  funds  a r e  
d e p o s i t e d  f o r  a  year  b u t  may b e  withdrawn t o  meet b a l a n c e  o f  payments 
emergencies)  t o  t h e i r  funds .  R i v a t e  p lacements  -- s e c u r i t y  i s s u e s  
n e g o t i a t e d  d i r e c t l y  r a t h e r  than  through p u b l i c  o f f e r i n g s  i n  c a p i t a l  
F i g u r e  4 .  Wor ld  Bank B o r r o w i n g  f r om 
O f f i c i a l  Sources, 1981-1985 
( m i l l i o n s  o f  US d o l l a r  e q u i v a l e n t )  
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(Source :  World Bank F i n a n c i a l  Opera t ions  Department) 
m a r k e t s  -- and d i r e c t  l o a n s  remain  o t h e r  major s o u r c e s  f o r  World Bank 
o f f i c i a l  borrowings .  Most have been a r ranged  ~i t h  OPEC governments  
i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  though t h i s  may change i f  t h e  p r i c e  o f  o i l  s t a y s  low. 
I Ques t ion  4 :  I 
I 1 
I How much h a s  t h e  Bank borrowed i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  i n  I 
1 r e c e n t  y e a r s ?  I 
I I 
A s  F i g u r e  5  ( n e x t  page) shows, t h e  World Bank d i d  n o t  borrow 
i n  t h e  U.S. c a p i t a l  market  a t  a l l  between 1979 and 1981,  and i t s  U.S. 
bor rowings  i n  1984 and 1985 were p r o p o r t i o n a l l y  much l e s s  t h a n  a  
d e c a d e  e a r l i e r .  The Bank h a s  borrowed i n c r e a s i n g  amounts o f  d o l l a r s  
i n  o v e r s e a s  ( E u r o d o l l a r )  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  d u r i n g  t h e  p a s t  decade .  Even 
s o ,  t h e  s h a r e  o f  i t s  borrowing which was denominated i n  d o l l a r s  h a s  
sometimes been  lower t h a n  u s u a l  i n  t h e  p a s t  decade .  The Bank h a s  a l s o  
used swaps t o  f u r t h e r  r e d u c e  i t s  d o l l a r  bor rowings .  In 1985,  f o r  
example ,  t h e  Bank swapped $1,058 m i l l i o n  i n  d o l l a r s  f o r  o t h e r  c u r r e n -  
c i e s ,  m a i n l y  Swiss f r a n c s ,  deu t schmarks ,  Dutch g u i l d e r s ,  and J a p a n e s e  
yen. Th i s  reduced t h e  n e t  e f f e c t i v e  s h a r e  o f  i t s  bor rowings  i n  d o l -  
l a r s  f o r  t h e  yea r  from about  31 t o  2 3  p e r c e n t .  
In a  swap, t h e  Bank c o n t r a c t s  wi th  a n o t h e r  p a r t y  -- o f t e n  a  
m u l t i n a t i o n a l  f i rm -- t o  t r a d e  o b l i g a t i o n s  t o  make a  s e r i e s  o f  pay- 
ments  i n  one  c u r r e n c y  f o r  a  s i m i l a r  o b l i g a t i o n  -- a t  t o d a y ' s  p r i c e s  -- 
i n  a n o t h e r  c u r r e n c y .  Both p a r t i e s  b e n e f i t  from t h e  swap, f o r  t h e y  c a n  
e a c h  t a k e  advan tage  of  t h e  o t h e r ' s  e s t a b l i s h e d  p o s i t i o n  i n  i t s  c a p i t a l  
marke t  t o  g e t  a  b e t t e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  on t h e  l o a n  i n  t h e  c u r r e n c y  t h e y  
r e a l l y  want t h a n  t h e y  c o u l d  g e t  i f  t h e y  borrowed t h e  f u n d s  d i r e c t l y .  
The World Bank c a n  borrow d o l l a r s  i n  t h e  E u r o d o l l a r  o r  U.S. m a r k e t  a t  
a  good r a t e ,  f o r  example,  and can  t h e n  swap t h o s e  d o l l a r s  f o r  Swiss 
f r a n c s  t h a t  t h e  swap p a r t n e r  borrowed i n  S w i t z e r l a n d  a t  a  v e r y  good 
r a t e .  The Bank can  t h u s  s w i t c h  a  l a r g e r  s h a r e  o f  bor rowings  i n t o  low 
i n t e r e s t  r a t e  c u r r e n c i e s  and t h e r e b y  r e d u c e  t h e  a v e r a g e  c o s t  o f  a n n u a l  
borrowings  .) 
Of i t s  $41.4  b i l l i o n  i n  o u t s t a n d i n g  l o a n s  a s  o f  J u n e  30,  1985,  
t h e  Bank r e p o r t s  t h a t  o n l y  $6.7 b i l l i o n  had been  d i s b u r s e d  i n  U.S. 
d o l l a r s  ( l e s s  than  t h e  n e t  amount borrowed i n  d o l l a r s  i n  o v e r s e a s  cap- 
i t a l  m a r k e t s  o r  from f o r e i g n  governments . )  The Bank s a y s  t h e  rest  o f  
i t s  d o l l a r  borrowings  w r e  he ld  i n  i t s  l i q u i d  a s s e t s  -- over  $12 b i l -  
l i o n  of which were i n v e s t e d  ( i n  d o l l a r s )  ma in ly  i n  government s e c u r i -  
t i e s ,  w i t h  a  l e s s e r  p r o p o r t i o n  i n v e s t e d  i n  o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  commercial  
banks  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s .  On a  n e t  b a s i s ,  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e  
Bank 's  borrowing program h a s  b rough t  more money i n t o  t h e  U. S. domes t i c  
c a p i t a l  market  t h a n  i t  h a s  t a k e n  o u t .  
Figure 5.  World Bank New Borrowings i n  the 
United States and Other Capital Markets, as a Share 
o f  All New Borrowing for the Year# 
(millions o f  US dollar equivalent) 
Borrowinps in U.S. 
Capital Market 
amount share I 
1.275.0 34.63% 1 
1;350.0 28.83% I 
750.0 20.73% 1 
none none I 
none none I 
none none I 
1,550.0 18.23% I 
3.450.0 33.58% 1 
1,399.0 13.22% 1 
1,118.5 10.09% 1 
Dollar Borrowings 
Other Markets1 
amount share -- 
750.0 20.37% 
Total WB Dollar 
Borrowings 
m o u n t  share I 
2,025.0 55.00% I 
Dollar Borrowings 
i n  U.S. 
Capital Markets 
Oollar Borrowings 1 








Excludes currency swaps (which may have the net effect of chanping the share of the 
Bank's borrowings in particular currencies) as well as refinanced short-term debt 
(for 1984 and 1985) and a minor borrowing (Interest Subsidy Fund) where the capital 
market is not identified. 
1 Includes public offerings on the Eurobond and Asian bond markets as well as dollar- 
denominated placements with central banks, governments and international organization6 
(Source:  World Bank annual reports, r e l e v a n t  years)  
I Ques t ion  5: I 
I 1 
I Why d o e s  t h e  World Bank, o f t e n  f o r  prolonged p e r i o d s ,  s t a y  I 
1 o u t o f c e r t a i n c a p i t a l m a r k e t s ?  I 
Between 1981 and 1985, t h e  World Bank s o l d  s e c u r i t i e s  t o  non- 
governmental  p u r c h a s e r s  i n  2 3  c o u n t r i e s  and borrowed from o f f i c i a l  
s o u r c e s  i n  96 c o u n t r i e s .  The Bank borrows r e g u l a r l y  i n  most  o f  t h e  
major  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s ,  b u t  i t  d o e s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  borrow i n  e v e r y  
market  e v e r y  yea r .  The World Bank's A r t i c l e s  of  Agreement s p e c i f y  
t h a t  i t  may borrow o n l y  w i t h  t h e  p e r m i s s i o n  o f  t h e  government i n  whose 
market  t h e  f u n d s  a r e  b e i n g  borrowed. Thus, t h e  Bank may have t o  l i m i t  
i t s  borrowing i f  a  g o v e r w e n t  c l o s e s  o r  r e s t r i c t s  a c c e s s  t o  i t s  coun- 
t r y ' s  c a p i t a l  marke t s  f o r  p o l i c y  r e a s o n s  o r  b e c a u s e  o f  b a l a n c e  of pay- 
ments  o r  o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  c o n s t r a i n t s .  As a  p r a c t i c a l  m a t t e r ,  t h e  Bank 
may a l s o  l i m i t  i t s  bor rowings  i n  a  c o u n t r y  f o r  economic r e a s o n s  i f  i t  
f i n d s  t h a t  i t  can  borrow money e l s e w h e r e  a t  b e t t e r  r a t e s .  I n  judg ing  
t h e  c o s t  o f  i t s  bor rowings ,  t h e  Bank l o o k s  n o t  o n l y  a t  t h e  c u r r e n t  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  f o r  l o a n s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  c u r r e n c i e s ,  b u t  a l s o  a t  whether 
t h e  s a v i n g s  on i n t e r e s t  c o s t s  w i l l  b e  nega ted  by f u t u r e  changes  i n  
c u r r e n c y  v a l u e s .  
I Ques t ion  6 :  I 
I I 
1 Are t h e  funds  t h e  Bank borrows earmarked f o r  any p a r t i c u l a r  1 
1 l o a n ,  p r o j e c t ,  o r  deve lop ing  coun t ry?  I 
I I 
No. The World Bank borrows i n  o r d e r  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
o f  i t s  o v e r a l l  l e n d i n g  program. The Bank d o e s  n o t  s e g r e g a t e  i t s  funds  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  p r o j e c t s  o r  c o u n t r i e s  f o r  which t h e y  w i l l  b e  used .  
I How d o e s  t h e  Bank d e c i d e  which c u r r e n c i e s  t o  borrow? 
1 What c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i s  g i v e n  t o  p o t e n t i a l  l o s s e s  from 
1 exchange r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s ?  
The World Bank i n t e r p r e t s  i t s  A r t i c l e s  of Agreement a s  p r o h i b i t -  
i n g  i t  from assuming any exchange r a t e  r i s k s  wi th  borrowed o r  sub- 
s c r i b e d  c a p i t a l .  Consequent ly ,  f o r  e v e r y  L i a b i l i t y  i n  a  c u r r e n c y ,  t h e  
Bank h a s  a  comparable  a s s e t  i n  t h e  same c u r r e n c y .  The c o u n t r i e s  bor-  
rowing from t h e  World Bank assume t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange r i s k s  on t h e i r  
l o a n s .  For accoun t ing  purposes ,  Bank l o a n  commitments a r e  denominated 
i n  d o l l a r s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  l o a n s  a r e  a c t u a l l y  d i s b u r s e d  i n  a  v a r i e t y  o f  
c u r r e n c i e s .  The bor rowers  must r epay  t h e  same amount i n  each  c u r r e n c y  
t h a t  t h e y  r e c e i v e d  when t h e  l o a n  was d i s b u r s e d  -- withou t  r e g a r d  f o r  
whether t h o s e  c u r r e n c i e s  may have gone up o r  down i n  v a l u e  r e l a t i v e  
t o  t h e  d o l l a r  o r  some o t h e r  benchmark c u r r e n c y  -- and t h e  Bank uses  
t h e  repayments t o  s a t i s f y  i t s  co r respond ing  o b l i g a t i o n s  i n  t h e s e  same 
c u r r e n c i e s .  The d o l l a r  v a l u e  of  Bank l o a n s  may change when t h e r e  a r e  
s h i f t s  i n  t h e  r e l a t i v e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  d i s b u r s e d  c u r r e n c i e s ,  b u t  t h e  
v a l u e  o f  t h e  Bank 's  o u t s t a n d i n g  o b l i g a t i o n s  ( i t s  bor rowings )  w i l l  
s h i f t  i n  a  compensating manner.  
The Bank g e n e r a l l y  o p e r a t e s ,  however,  a s  i f  i t  were t a k i n g  cur-  
r e n c y  r i s k s  i n  i t s  l o a n  o p e r a t i o n s .  Thus,  i t  s e e k s  t o  borrow and d i s -  
b u r s e  i n  c u r r e n c i e s  where t h e  chances  o f  an  upward r e v a l u a t i o n  a r e  
l i m i t e d .  ( I n  o t h e r  words,  i t  t r i e s  t o  avoid s i t u a t i o n s  where c u r r e n c y  
v a l u e s  will go  up and t h e  l o a n  repayments will be worth more than t h e  
v a l u e  o f  t h e  money l e n t . )  It t r i e s  t o  e s t i m a t e  whether t h e  sav ing  
from borrowing c u r r e n c y  wi th  a  low nominal i n t e r e s t  r a t e  might  b e  o f f -  
s e t  by a  r e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h a t  c u r r e n c y  a t  some p o i n t  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  
In many c a s e s ,  t h e  Bank's  bor rowers  have b e n e f i t e d  from t h i s  pro- 
c e d u r e .  Because t h e  U .  S.  d o l l a r  i n c r e a s e d  i n  v a l u e  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  
t h e  deve lop ing  c o u n t r i e s  have been a b l e  t o  use t h e i r  d o l l a r  h o l d i n g s  
i f  they  wished t o  buy c h e a p l y  t h e  c u r r e n c i e s  t h e y  needed t o  pay t h e i r  
non-do l l a r  d e b t s .  The r e a l  c o s t  o f  r epay ing  t h e i r  dol lar -denominated 
l o a n s  i n c r e a s e d ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  bu t  t h e  l a r g e s t  p o r t i o n  of  t h e i r  d e b t s  t o  
t h e  Bank have been denominated i n  o t h e r  c u r r e n c i e s .  The World Bank 
e s t i m a t e s  t h a t  t h e  deve lop ing  c o u n t r i e s  cou ld  have made a  p r o f i t  of  
$5 b i l l i o n ,  a s  o f  December 31,  1985,  i f  t h e y  had locked i n  t h e  then- 
c u r r e n t  exchange r a t e s  th rough  forward exchange m a r k e t s  ( t h a t  i s ,  
through c o n t r a c t s  t o  s e l l  t h a t  amount of  d o l l a r s  i n  t h e i r  own f o r e i g n  
exchange r e s e r v e s  a t  a  f u t u r e  t ime a t  t h e  exchange r a t e  p r e v a i l i n g  a t  
t h e  end of 1985.)  
In  a d d i t i o n  t o  i t s  d e s i r e  t o  avoid d i s b u r s i n g  c u r r e n c i e s  which 
a r e  l i k e l y  t o  go up i n  v a l u e ,  t h e  World Bank h a s  o t h e r  r e a s o n s  f o r  
us ing  s e v e r a l  ma jo r  c u r r e n c i e s .  F i r s t ,  t h e  Bank s e e k s  t o  d i v e r s i f y  
t h e  number o f  c a p i t a l  marke t s  from which i t  draws i t s  funds  i n  o r d e r  
t o  avoid undue dependence on any p a r t i c u l a r  m a r k e t .  (By keeping i t s  
name known i n  v a r i o u s  m a r k e t s  -- even when i t  h a s  no p r e s s i n g  need f o r  
ma jor  borrowings  i n  t h o s e  m a r k e t s  -- t h e  Bank p r o t e c t s  i t s  f u t u r e  
a c c e s s  t o  c a p i t a l .  C o u n t r i e s  sometimes l i m i t  o r  c l o s e  t h e i r  marke t s  
t o  f o r e i g n  b o r r o w e r s ,  and t h e  Bank wants c o n t i n u i n g  a c c e s s  t o  a l t e r n a -  
t i v e  s o u r c e s  i n  o t h e r  marke t s  .) Second, t h e  Bank wants t o  expand t h e  
number o f  l e n d i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w i t h  which i t  d e a l s .  T h i r d ,  t h e  Bank 
may want t o  borrow a  s p e c i f i c  mix o f  c u r r e n c i e s  because  i t  i s  plann- 
i n g  t o  d i s b u r s e  i t s  l o a n s  i n  t h o s e  c u r r e n c i e s  o r  because  i t  i s  plann- 
i n g  t o  "swap" one c u r r e n c y  f o r  a n o t h e r .  
I How s e c u r e  a r e  l o a n s  made t o  t h e  World Bank? I 
I What p r o t e c t i o n s  a r e  o f f e r e d  t o  a  World Bank bondholder?  1 
I How l i k e l y  i s  i t  t h a t  c a l l a b l e  c a p i t a l  will be  c a l l e d ?  I 
I I 
There a r e  s e v e r a l  k i n d s  of  a s s u r a n c e s  f o r  t h e  World Bank bond- 
h o l d e r .  Some prov ide  d i r e c t  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  b o n d h o l d e r ' s  i n v e s t -  
ment whi le  o t h e r s  p rov ide  a s s u r a n c e s  r e g a r d i n g  i t s  g e n e r a l  s e c u r i t y .  
C a l l a b l e  c a p i t a l  w i l l  be c a l l e d  o n l y  i f  t h e  Bank h a s  e x h a u s t e d  i t s  
e x i s t i n g  r e s o u r c e s  and i t  s t i l l  needs  a d d i t i o n a l  f u n d s  t o  cover  i t s  
remain ing  l i a b i l i t i e s  t o  t h o s e  who l e n t  i t  money. 
1.  D i r e c t  P r o t e c t i o n s  f o r  Bondholders 
A. I n f o r m a t i o n .  Though t h e  World Bank i s  exempt from most o f  t h e  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  of U.S. s e c u r i t i e s  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  s e c t i o n  15 o f  t h e  B r e t t o n  
Woods Agreements Act ( t h e  b a s i c  law govern ing  U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  
t h e  Bank) r e q u i r e s  t h e  Bank t o  f i l e  such  r e p o r t s  a s  t h e  S e c u r i t y  and 
Exchange Commission b e l i e v e s  n e c e s s a r y  '' f o r  t h e  p r o t e c t  i o n  o f  inves -  
t o r s . "  The Bank f i l e s  q u a r t e r l y  and annua l  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  and 
r e g u l a r  i n f o r m a t i o n  s t a t e m e n t s  t h a t  p rov ide  i n f o r m a t i o n  which can  b e  
v e r y  u s e f u l  t o  i n v e s t o r s  who a r e  a s s e s s i n g  t h e  r i s k  o f  a  p o s s i b l e  
inves tment  i n  World Bank s e c u r i t i e s .  By a c c o r d i n g  World Bank bonds  
a  AAA r a t i n g ,  t bond r a t i n g  companies have shown a  f a v o r a b l e  a s s e s s -  
ment o f  Bank a s  t s ,  i t s  p o r t f o l i o ,  and i t s  b a s i c  f i n a n c i a l  s i t u a t i o n .  
B .  Lega l  p r o t e c t i o n .  The bondholder  h a s  s e v e r a l  l e g a l  p r o t e c -  
t i o n s .  'Ihe Ba s accorded i t s  bondholders  t h e  r i g h t ,  i f  i t  shou ld  
m i s s  any payme f  p r i n c i p a l  o r  i n t e r e s t ,  t o  demand repayment o f  
t h e  t o t a l  amou e them. The A r t i c l e s  o f  Agreement and t h e  B r e t t o n  
Woods Agreements Act p rov ide  t h a t  t h e  World Bank c a n  be  s u e d ,  i n  t h e  
F e d e r a l  c o u r t s  o f  t h e  D i s t r i c t  o f  Columbia, f o r  enforcement  o f  i t s  
o b l i g a t i o n s  . 
The A r t i c l e s  o f  Agreement s p e c i f y  t h a t  t h e  Bank's  a s s e t s  s h a l l  
be immune from a l l  forms o f  s e i z u r e ,  a t t a c h m e n t ,  o r  e x e c u t i o n  b e f o r e  
t h e  d e l i v e r y  o f  f i n a l  judgment a g a i n s t  t h e  Bank. By i m p l i c a t i o n ,  t h e n ,  
t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  bondholder  may be  u p h e l d ,  and a s s e t s  c o l l e c t e d ,  
t h r o u g h  j u d i c i a l  a c t i o n  and due p r o c e s s  o f  law.  It a p p e a r s ,  however ,  
t h a t  bondho lders  canno t  s u e  t h e  Bank's  member c o u n t r i e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  
s e c u r e  repayment on t h e  d e b t s .  The A r t i c l e s  o f  Agreement s p e c i f y  t h a t  
a  warning must be p laced on a l l  World Bank s e c u r i t i e s  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  
t h e y  a r e  n o t  an  o b l i g a t i o n  o f  any government .  As  no ted  b e f o r e ,  t h e  
A r t i c l e s  l i m i t  t h e  l i a b i l i t y  o f  member c o u n t r i e s  t o  t h e  t o t a l  v a l u e  o f  
t h e i r  s u b s c r i b e d  c a p i t a l .  
2 .  P r o t e c t i o n s  A g a i n s t  Inso lvency  
The World Bank r e l i e s  o n  i t s  income, a s s e t s ,  and c a l l a b l e  c a p i t a l  
t o  a s s u r e  i t s  bondho lders  t h a t  i t  w i l l  have t h e  f u n d s  t o  r e p a y  them 
when i t s  borrowings  come due .  In e f f e c t ,  t h e s e  a r e  t h e  Bank 's  t h r e e  
l i n e s  o f  d e f e n s e  a g a i n s t  i n s o l v e n c y .  F i g u r e  6 ( n e x t  page) i l l u s t r a t e s  
F i g u r e  6 .  Amounts Owed by t h e  Wor ld  Bank 
as o f  Dec. 31, 1985, and t h e  Bank ' s  Three L i n e s  
o f  Defense A g a i n s t  I n s o l v e n c y  
'O T and D e f a u l t  on i t s  Own Debt  ( b i l l i o n s  o f  US d o l l a r  e q u i v a l e n t )  
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1 T h i r d  L i n e  / >I Second L i n e  o f  De fense  I-, o f  Defense 
t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  A t  t h e  f a r  l e f t  i s  shown t h e  f u l l  $61 .1  b i l l i o n  which 
t h e  World Bank owed a s  of December 31, 1985. The f u l l  d e b t  d o e s  no t  
c a n e  due a l l  a t  once ,  however.  'Ihe World Bank i s  scheduled t o  r epay  
l e n d e r s  $7.6 b i l l i o n  ( i n  shor t - t e rm and medium- o r  long-term d e b t )  i n  
f i s c a l  1986. S i m i l a r  amounts come due i n  succeeding y e a r s .  The 
q u e s t i o n  i s  whether t h e  Bank's f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  s u f f i c e n t  t o  
cope wi th  t h i s  s e r i e s  o f  annual  repayment r e q u e s t s  from bondholders .  
A .  The F i r s t  L i n e  of  Defense.  The Bank's f i r s t  l i n e  o f  d e f e n s e  
i s  t h e  s t r eam of l o a n  repayments i t  a n t i c i p a t e s  r e c e i v i n g  from i t s  
borrower  c o u n t r i e s .  In f i s c a l  1986,  t h e  Bank i s  scheduled t o  r e p a y  
$7.644 b i l l i o n  t o  r e t i r e  o u t s t a n d i n g  deb t  a s  i t  c a n e s  d u e .  It a l s o  
e x p e c t s  t o  r e c e i v e  $3.977 b i l l i o n  from i t s  bor rowers  i n  f i s c a l  1986 
i n  p r i n c i p a l  repayments on t h e i r  l o a n s .  The r e f l o w  o f  l o a n  repayments  
w i l l  e n a b l e  t h e  Bank t o  r e p a y  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  p a r t  o f  i t s  own d e b t  a s  
t h e  o b l i g a t i o n s  comes d u e .  The Bank w i l l  r e f i n a n c e  t h e  remaining 
$3.667 b i l l i o n  o f  t h a t  d e b t .  Most o f  t h i s  ($3.45 b i l l i o n )  i s  s h o r t -  
term d e b t ,  which i s  normal ly  r o l l e d  o v e r .  Only about  $217 m i l l i o n  o f  
i t  w i l l  b e  medium- and long-term d e b t  due i n  f i s c a l  1986. 
As a  m a t t e r  o f  p o l i c y ,  t h e  World Bank d o e s  n o t  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  
d e b t  r e s c h e d u l i n g s .  It e x p e c t s  bor rowers  t o  r e p a y  on schedu le .  The 
Bank r e q u i r e s  t h a t  governments g u a r a n t e e  t h e  repayment of  a l l  l o a n s  
t h e  Bank makes t o  e n t i t i e s  i n  t h e i r  c o u n t r i e s .  Hence, any  f a i l u r e  t o  
pay would be  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  g o v e r n n e n t ,  n o t  a  p r i v a t e  e n t i t y  i n  
t h e  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y .  The Bank h a s  a  p o l i c y  o f  t e r m i n a t i n g  a l l  d i s -  
bursements  on i t s  o u t s t a n d i n g  l o a n s  t o  a  c o u n t r y  i f  a  borrower  t h e r e  
f a l l s  more t h a n  75 d a y s  behind i n  i t s  d e b t  repayments  t o  t h e  Bank. 
So long a s  t h e  Bank's  d e b t  repayment p i c t u r e  i s  sound and i t s  
bor rowers  a r e  r e p a y i n g  t h e i r  l o a n s  on t i m e ,  t h e  Bank should  have 
l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l t y  borrowing t h e  n e c e s s a r y  money t o  c o v e r  modest s h o r t -  
f a l l s  b y  r e f i n a n c i n g  i t s  r emain ing  d e b t s .  In an ext reme -- i f  perhaps  
improbab le  -- s i t u a t i o n ,  such a s  a  c o l l a p s e  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n -  
a n c i a l  sys tem,  t h e  r e f i n a n c i n g  o p t i o n  may n o t  be  a v a i l a b l e .  The bor-  
rowing a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  t h u s  shown i n  F i g u r e  6  w i t h  d o t t e d  l i n e s .  
B .  The Second L i n e  of  Defense .  The Bank1 s a s s e t s  a r e  t h e  second 
l i n e  of  d e f e n s e  a s s u r i n g  repayment o f  i t s  o u t s t a n d i n g  o b l i g a t i o n s .  
This  p rocedure  comes i n t o  e f f e c t  o n l y  i f  t h e  Bank e x p e r i e n c e s  a sub-  
s t a n t i a l  d r o p  i n  repayments  from i t s  bor rowers .  
Bank spokesmen s a y  t h a t  t h e  c o s t  o f  any d e f a u l t s  would be  f i r s t  
cha rged  a g a i n s t  t h e  Bank 's  n e t  income f o r  t h e  y e a r .  'Ihe Bank 's  n e t  
income i s  t h e  sun o f  i t s  income from inves tment  e a r n i n g s  and l o a n  
c h a r g e s ,  less i t s  o u t l a y s  f o r  i n t e r e s t ,  borrowing c o s t s ,  and adminis-  
t r a t i v e  expenses .  D e f a u l t s  a r e  o p e r a t i n g  l o s s e s ,  changes  i n  t h e  v a l u e  
o f  a c c o u n t s  r e c e i v a b l e ,  which must  b e  paid  f o r  o u t  o f  c u r r e n t  income. 
The a c c o u n t i n g  r u l e s  s a y  t h e y  a r e  no t  supposed t o  b e  covered  th rough  
n e g a t i v e  a d j u s t m e n t s  i n  t h e  l e n d i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n ' s  c a p i t a l  a c c o u n t s .  
The Bank's  n e t  income, i n  m i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s ,  f o r  t h e  p a s t  f i v e  
y e a r s  was a s  f o l l o w s :  
A s  o f  i t s  mid-point  on December 31,  1985,  t h e  Bank 's  n e t  income f o r  
f i s c a l  1986 was $695 m i l l i o n .  These amounts should  b e  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  
c o v e r  smal l  l o s s e s .  
The World Bank h a s  never  e x p e r i e n c e d  a  formal d e f a u l t  o n  i t s  
l o a n s .  However, i n  December 1984,  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e ,  a  borrower  
c o u n t r y  ( ~ i c a r a g u a )  f e l l  more t h a n  s i x  months behind on i t s  l o a n  pay- 
ments .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e  Bank pu t  t h e  Nicaraguan l o a n s  o n  n o n a c c r u a l  
s t a t u s  -- an accoun t ing  s t a t u s  which i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  no income i s  b e i n g  
r e c e i v e d  from t h e  l o a n .  S ince  t h e n ,  L i b e r i a  a l s o  b r i e f l y  f e l l  more 
than  s i x  months b e h i n d ,  b u t  i t  s u b s e q u e n t l y  c l e a r e d  up i t s  a r r e a r a g e .  
N i c a r a g u a ' s  $9 m i l l i o n  a r r e a r a g e  i n  p r i n c i p a l  i s  t h e  o n l y  c a s e  where 
payments a r e  s e r i o u s l y  o v e r d u e .  The Bank h a s  ceased  d i s b u r s e m e n t s  o n  
a l l  i t s  Nicaraguan l o a n s ,  a s  i t s  p o l i c i e s  r e q u i r e .  The Bank s a y s  t h a t  
i t  e x p e c t s  t o  r e c o v e r  t h e  Eunds e v e n t u a l l y .  Should t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
d e t e r i o r a t e  f u r t h e r ,  however,  t h e  Bank may e v e n t u a l l y  have t o  d e c l a r e  
a  l o s s  o n  a l l  o r  some o f  t h e  $163 m i l l i o n  i n  o u t s t a n d i n g  Nicaraguan 
l o a n s .  Even s o ,  i f  t h e  Bank had t o  d e c l a r e  i t s  e n t i r e  Nicaraguan 
p o r t f o l i o  a  l o s s  and w r i t e  o f f  t h e  whole amount a t  o n c e ,  f o r  example ,  
t h e  r e s u l t  m u l d  o n l y  be  a  modest d r o p  i n  t h e  Bank's t o t a l  annua l  
e a r n i n g s .  
I f  t h e  Bank exper ienced  so  many d e f a u l t s  t h a t  i t s  n e t  income f o r  
t h e  year  was e x h a u s t e d ,  i t  cou ld  draw on accumulated r e s e r v e s  fo r  t h e  
funds  needed t o  repay  c r e d i t o r s .  Bank spokesmen say t h e  a s s e t s  would 
be  d r a m  upon i n  t h e  fo l lowing  o r d e r :  F i r s t ,  a f t e r  e x h a u s t i n g  annual  
income, t h e  Bank would use t h e  r e t a i n e d  e a r n i n g s  h e l d  i n  t h e  s p e c i a l  
r e s e r v e  ($293 m i l l i o n ) ,  which i s  earmarked -- a s  r e q u i r e d  by t h e  Arti- 
c l e s  o f  Agreement -- f o r  t h e  purpose o f  c o v e r i n g  d e f i c i e n c i e s  o f  t h i s  
s o r t .  Next ,  i t  would use t h e  r e t a i n e d  e a r n i n g s  held  i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  
r e s e r v e  ($4.769 b i l l i o n  a t  t h e  end of 1 9 8 5 ) ,  which i s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  
t h i s  purpose  b u t  no t  l e g a l l y  earmarked f o r  c o v e r i n g  d e f a u l t s .  F i n a l l y ,  
a f t e r  t h e  two p r i o r  s o u r c e s  o f  e q u i t y  were used up, t h e  Bank would 
d raw on t h e  paid-in p o r t i o n  o f  i t s  c a p i t a l  s t o c k  ($5.812 b i l l i o n  a s  
of  December 1985)  t o  cover  i t s  remaining l i a b i l i t i e s .  I f  t h e  Bank 
n e e d s  a d d i t i o n a l  funds  a f t e r  t h i s ,  i t  might use some o f  t h e  borrowed 
p o r t i o n  o f  i t s  l i q u i d  a s s e t s  t o  s e t t l e  d e b t s .  (See  t h e  answer t o  
q u e s t i o n  1 0  f o r  a  d i s c u s s i o n  of  I B R D  l i q u i d  a s s e t s . )  I t  might  b e  
a b l e  t o  g e n e r a t e  more funds by s e l l i n g  some o f  i t s  $52 b i l l i o n  p o r t -  
f o l i o  o f  e x i s t i n g  l o a n s .  These s a l e s  would need t h e  c o o p e r a t i o n  o f  
governments and would depend on t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  world f i n a n c i a l  
sys tem and t h e  w i l l i n g n e s s  of  p r i v a t e  i n v e s t o r s  t o  purchase  t h e  e x i s t -  
i n g  l o a n s .  For t h i s  r e a s o n ,  t h e  column showing t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  IBRD 
l o a n  p o r t f o l i o  i s  shown i n  d o t t e d  l i n e s  i n  F i g u r e  6. 
Leaving a s i d e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  Bank might sel l  some o f  
i t s  l o a n s  t o  g e n e r a t e  a d d i t i o n a l  f u n d s ,  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e  World Bank 
would p robab ly  b e  a b l e  t o  make scheduled payments t o  bondho lders  ( b o t h  
repayments  a s  t h e y  come due and i n t e r e s t  on t h e  o u t s t a n d i n g  b a l a n c e )  
f o r  a t  l e a s t  two o r  t h r e e  y e a r s  s imply by r e l y i n g  on i t s  $10.6 b i l l i o n  
i n  r e s e r v e s  ( e q u i t y  and paid- in  c a p i t a l )  and i t s  $9.2 b i l l i o n  i n  bor-  
rowed l i q u i d  a s s e t s .  T h i s  assumes t h a t  t h e  Bank r e c e i v e s  no loan  
repayments from any  bor rowers  d u r i n g  t h a t  p e r i o d .  The t ime per iod 
would be l o n g e r ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  i f  some bor rowers  kept  making payments. 
C .  The T h i r d  L i n e  of  Defense .  The Bank's  c a l l a b l e  c a p i t a l  i s  
t h e  u l t i m a t e  t x o t e c t i o n  o f f e r e d  t o  bondholders .  I f  d e f a u l t s  d e p l e t e d  
t h e  World ~ a n k ' s  e x i s t i n g  a s s e t s ,  i t  would have t o  use t h i s  t h i i d  l i n e  
o f  d e f e n s e  t o  g e n e r a t e  t h e  funds t o  repay c r e d i t o r s .  A s  o f  Decanber 
1985,  t h e  Bank had c a l l a b l e  c a p i t a l  s u b s c r i p t i o n s  o f  $61.1 b i l l i o n .  
C o i n c i d e n t l y ,  i t s  borrowings  t o t a l l e d  $61.5  b i l l i o n .  
The Bank 's  A r t i c l e s  of  Agreement s t a t e  t h a t  c a l l a b l e  c a p i t a l  may 
b e  c a l l e d  o n l y  t o  s a t i s f y  Bank o b l i g a t i o n s  t o  i t s  c r e d i t o r s .  C a l l a b l e  
c a p i t a l  c a n  n o t  b e  c a l l e d  mere ly  t o  provide  t h e  Bank wi th  loan  f u n d s  
when t h e  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  marke t s  a r e  u n w i l l i n g  t o  l end  i t  money. The 
A r t i c l e s  of  Agreement a l s o  say  t h e  Bank must make c a l l s  o n  c a l l a b l e  
c a p i t a l  on a  p ro - ra ta  b a s i s ,  w i t h  each  member c o u n t r y  p r o v i d i n g  a  
s h a r e  o f  t h e  needed funds  cor respond ing  t o  i t s  s h a r e  o f  ownership  i n  
t h e  Bank. I f  some c o u n t r i e s  should  d e f a u l t  on t h e i r  o b l i g a t i o n s  t o  
honor a  World Bank c a p i t a l  c a l l ,  t h e  o t h e r s  would presumably have t o  
c o v e r  t h e  s h o r t f a l l  through a n o t h e r  p r o p o r t i o n a l  c a l l  on c a l l a b l e  
c a p i t a l .  
The A r t i c l e s  o f  Agreement s a y  t h a t  no c o u n t r y  may b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  
s u p p l y  more than  t h e  t o t a l  v a l u e  o f  i t s  s u b s c r i b e d  c a p i t a l  . Thus, 
i f  t h e  Bank uses  up a l l  i t s  a s s e t s ,  i f  t h e  b o r r o w e r s  make no f u r t h e r  
l o a n  repayments ,  and i f  member c o u n t r i e s  f a i l  t o  honor a l l  t h e i r  c a l l -  
a b l e  c a p i t a l  p l e d g e s ,  t h e  Bank t h e n  may be  unable  t o  r e p a y  i t s  c r e d -  
i t o r s  a s  i t s  bor rowings  come d u e .  Most a n a l y s t s  b e l i e v e  t h i s  series 
o f  e v e n t u a l i t i e s  i s  most u n l i k e l y .  
I I. FINANCIAL OPERATIONS 
I Ques t ion  9 .  I 
I I 
I Where d o e s  t h e  Bank g e t  t h e  money i t  u s e s  t o  pay s t a f f  and I 
I c over  o t h e r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and o p e r a t i n g  c o s t s ?  I 
Both t h e  I B R D  and t h e  I D A  pay t h e i r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  expenses  o u t  
o f  o p e r a t i n g  revenues  ( i n c a n e  from i n v e s t m e n t s  and i n t e r e s t  payments 
f r w .  b o r r o w e r s ) .  The I B R D  normal ly  r u n s  a  n e t  s u r p l u s  a f t e r  e x p e n s e s ,  
and u s e s  i t s  n e t  income t o  expand r e s e r v e s  and t o  make an annual  con- 
t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  I D A .  (The Bank's $2.07 b i l l i o n  c u m u l a t i v e  c o n t r i b u -  
t i o n  makes i t  t h e  f i f t h  l a r g e s t  donor  t o  IDA. The Bank h a s  no v o t e ,  
however,  i n  I D A  d e l i b e r a t i o n s . )  Some c r i t i c s  s a y  t h e  Bank shou ld  pay 
d i v i d e n d s  t o  i t s  s t o c k h o l d e r s  i n s t e a d  of  c o n t r i b u t i n g  money t o  IDA 
and expanding I B R D  r e s e r v e s .  The Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  responded i n  
i t s  1982 a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks ,  however,  t h a t  t h i s  
would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e ,  i n  l i g h t  o f  t h e  Bank's s p e c i a l  r o l e  i n  t h e  
world f i n a n c i a l  sys tem.  
Because the  Bank h a s  s i g n f i c a n t  r e s e r v e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  pa id - in  
c a p i t a l ,  i t  h a s  been a b l e  t o  borrow f u n d s  a t  advantageous  r a t e s  and 
p r o v i d e  i t s  own bor rowers  wi th  development l o a n s  a t  t h e  lowes t  pos- 
s i b l e  r a t e s .  The Bank i n v e s t s  t h e  pa id - in  c a p i t a l ,  a long  w i t h  i t s  
o t h e r  r e s e r v e s ,  and u s e s  t h e  income from i n v e s t m e n t s  t o  h e l p  f i n a n c e  
o p e r a t i n g  expenses .  T h e r e f o r e ,  pa id - in  c a p i t a l  d o e s  have a  r o l e  i n  
h e l p i n g  s u p p o r t  IBRD a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t s .  The p r o p o r t i o n  o f  i n v e s t -  
ment e a r n i n g s  d e r i v e d  from t h e s e  a s s e t s  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l ,  however. 
The IBRD d o e s  n o t  d i r e c t l y  u s e  borrowed funds  o r  paid- in  c a p i t a l  t o  
f i n a n c e  o p e r a t i n g  expenses .  The United S t a t e s  h a s  urged i n  p a s t  I B R D  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e r e  b e  no more paid- in  c a p i t a l  and t h a t  a l l  f u t u r e  
IBRD s u b s c r i p t i o n s  should  i n v o l v e  o n l y  c a l l a b l e  c a p i t a l .  The o t h e r  
ma jor  member c o u n t r i e s  have  i n s i s t e d ,  however,  t h a t  t h e  Bank' s f inan-  
c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  should  b e  expanded th rough  some a d d i t i o n a l  p a i d - i n  
c a p i t a l  a t  t h e  t ime  of  each  c a p i t a l  i n c r e a s e .  
The I D A ,  by c o n t r a s t ,  u s u a l l y  r u n s  a  l o s s  on i t s  c u r r e n t  o p e r a -  
t i o n s .  The f i g u r e s  ( i n  m i l l i o n s  of d o l l a r s )  f o r  t h e  l a s t  f i v e  y e a r s  
were a s  f o l l o w s :  
One r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  I D A  l o a n s  have a  much l o n g e r  pay- 
back  p e r i o d  than  d o  IBRD l o a n s .  The IDA must w a i t  a  much l o n g e r  t ime 
t o  r e c o v e r  expenses  from l o a n  r e c e i p t s .  Another r e a s o n  i s  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  IDA'S i n c a n e  d o e s  n o t  grow i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  i t s  growing expenses .  
IDA'S volume o f  l e n d i n g  h a s  more t h a n  doubled i n  t h e  p a s t  decade and 
i t s  income i s  d e r i v e d  from payments on i t s  e x i s t i n g  l o a n s  w h i l e  i t s  
c o s t s  come £ran  new l o a n  p r e p a r a t i o n s .  Consequent ly ,  because  o f  t h i s  
s h o r t f a l l ,  some o f  t h e  money c o n t r i b u t e d  by d o n o r s  i s  used t o  s u p p o r t  
I D A  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t s .  The I D A  a n t i c i p a t e s  however, t h a t  it should  
b e  a b l e  t o  repay t h e  funds i t  i s  c u r r e n t l y  drawing from c o n t r i b u t e d  . . 
r e s o u r c e s  a s  i t  s t a r t s  g e t t i n g  income from new l o a n s .  
The IDA c h a r g e s  no i n t e r e s t  on i t s  l o a n s .  It d o e s  l e v y ,  though ,  
a  314 o f  one pe rcen t  s e r v i c e  c h a r g e  ( a  "handl ing charge") on t h e  d i s -  
bursed p o r t i o n  o f  each l o a n  and -- s i n c e  January  1982 -- a 112 of  o n e  
p e r c e n t  commitment charge  y e a r l y  on t h e  undisbursed b a l a n c e .  Like  t h e  
I B R D ,  t h e  IDA i n c u r s  most o f  i t s  o p e r a t i n g  c o s t s  f o r  each l o a n  p r i o r  
t o  t h e  l o a n ' s  a p p r o v a l .  Cons ide r ing  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  bor rowers '  f u t u r e  
s e r v i c e  payments ( t h e  "hand l ing  charge") and commitment f e e ,  t h e  IDA 
w i l l  r e c e i v e  more from i t s  bor rowers  over  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t h e  l o a n  t h a n  
i t  s p e n t  i n  p r e p a r i n g  and a d m i n i s t e r i n g  i t s  l o a n s .  ( I n  o t h e r  words, 
t h e  p r e s e n t  v a l u e  o f  t h e  new I D A  l o a n s  exceeds  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t s  .) 
The IDA d o e s  n o t  have a  s t a f f  o f  i t s  own. I n s t e a d ,  t h e  IDA pays  
t h e  IBRD a  management f e e  ($273.2 m i l l i o n  i n  1985 and $249.23 m i l l i o n  
i n  1984) which r e p r e s e n t s  i t s  s h a r e  o f  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  expenses  
i n c u r r e d  by t h e  LBRD. 
I Ques t ion  10: I 
I I 
Why d o e s  t h e  World Bank keep l a r g e  amounts o f  money o n  I 
hand a s  l i q u i d  r e s o u r c e s ?  Where d o e s  i t  come from? I 
What c u r r e n c i e s  a r e  held?  1 
I 
The Bank h a s  a  p o l i c y  o f  h o l d i n g ,  a s  l i q u i d  a s s e t s ,  a  s u n  e q u a l  
t o  about  4 0  t o  4 5  p e r c e n t  o f  i t s  a n t i c i p a t e d  n e t  cash  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  
t h e  n e x t  t h r e e  y e a r s .  The Bank o b t a i n s  t h e  funds  th rough  i t s  r e g u l a r  
borrowing program. 'Ihe Bank wants l i q u i d i t i e s  o f  t h i s  s o r t  so  i t  can 
be s u r e  i t  h a s  t h e  f u n d s  t o  meet a l l  d i sbursement  and d e b t  r e t i r e m e n t  
o b l i g a t i o n s  over  a  s u s t a i n e d  pe r iod  of  t ime  wi thou t  any  need f o r  new 
bor rowings .  Th i s  makes t h e  Bank r e l a t i v e l y  independent  o f  c u r r e n t  
c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s ,  f r e e i n g  i t  from t h e  need t o  borrow 
d u r i n g  shor t - t e rm p e r i o d s  o f  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  c o s t s .  
In the  p a s t  f i v e  y e a r s ,  t h e  World Bank's l i q u i d i t y  s i t u a t i o n  ( t h a t  
i s ,  i t s  c a s h  and l i q u i d  i n v e s t m e n t s  n e t  o f  commitments fo r  s e t t l e m e n t  
and c a s h  c o l l a t e r a l  r e c e i v e d )  h a s  been a s  f o l l o w s  ( i n  m i l l i o n s  o f  
d o l l a r s )  : 
The Bank's  l i q u i d  a s s e t s  a r e  f u l l y  i n v e s t e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  maximize 
t h e  r e t u r n  on i t s  inves tment .  The Bank i n v e s t s  o n l y  i n  t h e  o b l i g a -  
t i o n s  o f  g o v e r m e n t s  ( i n c l u d i n g  a g e n c i e s  o f  t h e  U. S. Government) and 
i n  t ime  d e p o s i t s  and o t h e r  u n c o n d i t i o n a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  banks  and f i n -  
a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The n e t  p r o f i t s  on t h e  Bank's  i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  t h e  
l a s t  f i v e  y e a r s  ( i n  m i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s )  were a s  f o l l o w s :  
The b u l k  o f  t h e  Bank's l i q u i d  a s s e t s  a r e  denominated i n  d o l l a r s .  On 
June 30 ,  1985, s a n e  79 pe rcen t  were i n  U.S. d o l l a r s ,  9  p e r c e n t  i n  U.K. 
pounds,  4  p e r c e n t  i n  Canadian d o l l a r s ,  and t h e  remainder  i n  about  17 
o t h e r  c u r r e n c i e s .  
111. LENDING OPERATIONS 
I Ques t ion  11: I 
I I 
1 Where d o e s  t h e  World Bank make inost o f  i t s  l o a n s  and what 1 
I k i n d s  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  d o e s  i t  f i n a n c e ?  I 
1 .  The Bank 's  Channine Loan P r i o r i t i e s  
The growth i n  t h e  Bank's  membership and o p e r a t i o n s  h a s  had an 
impor tan t  e f f e c t  on t h e  g l o b a l  p a t t e r n  o f  i t s  o p e r a t i o n s .  F i g u r e  7 
( n e x t  page) shows t h a t  i n  i t s  f i r s t  decade  a lmost  40 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  
IBRD's new l o a n  commitments were t o  c o u n t r i e s  i n  Europe,  t h e  Middle 
E a s t ,  and North A f r i c a  -- m o s t l y  t o  Western  Europe.  (The r e g i o n a l  
c a t e g o r i e s  a r e  t h e  Bank 's . )  From 1947 t o  1956,  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  coun- 
t r i e s  o f  Western Europe and Japan  were among t h e  Bank's  l a r g e s t  bor -  
rowers  a s  t h e y  sought  money t o  r e b u i l d  t h e i r  war-torn economies.  A s  
more deve lop ing  c o u n t i e s  jo ined  the  Bank i n  t h e  19608, and a s  t h e  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  I D A  made i t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  Bank t o  expand l end-  
ing t o  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  were too  poor t o  a f f o r d  many I B R D  l o a n s ,  t h e  
l e v e l  o f  Bank l e n d i n g  t o  South Asia and A f r i c a  i n c r e a s e d  c o n s i d e r a b l y .  
The p r o p o r t i o n  o f  Bank l o a n  commitments ( m a i n l y  IBRD) t o  c o u n t r i e s  i n  
Europe,  t h e  Middle E a s t ,  and North A f r i c a  remained s i g n i f i c a n t .  In 
t h i s  r e g i o n ,  however,  t h e  focus  o f  l e n d i n g  s h i f t e d  from Western Europe 
t o  t h e  Balkans and t h e  rapidly-growing c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  Arab world. 
Along w i t h  Japan  ( i n  t h e  East  Asia g r o u p , )  t h e  Western European coun- 
t r i e s  and I s r a e l  g radua ted  £ ran  b e i n g  bor rowers  t o  b e i n g  s o u r c e s  o f  
c a p i t a l  o r  d o n o r s  f o r  IBBD and I M  o p e r a t i o n s .  
There remain some s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r o v e r s i e s  w i t h i n  t h e  Bank about  
t h e  r e l a t i v e  amounts which ahould be  l e n t  t o  d i f f e r e n t  r e g i o n s .  The 
arguments a r e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a c c u t e  r e g a r d i n g  a l l o c a t i o n s  of I D A  funds  . 
In t h e  p a s t ,  I n d i a  r e c e i v e d  about 40 p e r c e n t  o f  I M ' s  new commitments 
each  yea r  -- t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a  c e i l i n g  which s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  geograph ic  d i v e r s i t y ,  no  more than t h i s  should  go t o  any 
F i g u r e  7. IBRD and I D A  Lend ing 
by Region, Four Time Per iods,  1947-85 
( m i  11 i o n s  o f  US do1 l a r  e q u i v a l e n t )  
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one  c o u n t r y .  Some a n a l y s t s  t h o u g h t  t h i s  was more t h a n  I n d i a  d e s e r v e d .  
O t h e r s  s a i d  it was n o t  enough,  s i n c e  I n d i a  c o n t a i n e d  over  60 p e r c e n t  
o f  t h e  people  l i v i n g  i n  IDA-e l ig ib le  c o u n t r i e s .  A f t e r  China j o i n e d  
t h e  Bank i n  1980, t h e  q u e s t i o n  about t h e  proper  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  I D A  
r e s o u r c e s  took  on a  new dimension.  Some people though t  t h a t  I n d i a  
and China should  each  g e t  40 p e r c e n t .  Others  c la imed t h e y  shou ld  
d i v i d e  I n d i a ' s  o r i g i n a l  s h a r e .  S t i l l  o t h e r s  wondered whether t h e  two 
Asian g i a n t s  should  be  e l i g i b l e  f o r  any IDA a i d  a t  a l l .  The q u e s t i o n  
was no t  whether t h e y  should  c e a s e  r e c e i v i n g  World Bank a s s i s t a n c e ,  b u t  
whether most o f  i t  should  be l e n t  on I B R D  o r  IDA t e r m s .  The d e b a t e  i s  
not  y e t  r e s o l v e d .  China and I n d i a  e a c h  have twice  a s  many people  a s  
d o e s  Sub-Saharan A f r i c a .  The i r  economies a r e  more complex and t h e i r  
advanced s e c t o r s  a r e  b e t t e r  deve loped .  They a r e  b o t h  v e r y  poor ,  how- 
e v e r ,  and have s u b s t a n t i a l  p o p u l a t i o n s  i n  g r e a t  need .  Because t h e i r  
economies a r e  more dynamic t h a n  t h o s e  o f  most A f r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  
Asian c o u n t r i e s  can  p robab ly  make more e f f i c i e n t  use o f  any  IDA a l l o -  
c a t i o n s .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  t h e y  can  p robab ly  b e t t e r  s u r v i v e  a  s h a r p  
c u t  i n  IDA a i d  than  can t h e  A f r i c a n s .  In 1985, 35 p e r c e n t  o f  I D A ' S  
new commitments were t o  A f r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s ,  whi le  22 p e r c e n t  were t o  
I n d i a  and 11 p e r c e n t  were t o  China.  
As t h e  geograph ic  focus  o f  i t s  l e n d i n g  s h i f t e d ,  t h e  s e c t o r a l  
emphases f o r  World Bank l e n d i n g  a l s o  changed.  F i g u r e  8 ( n e x t  page) 
shows t h e  s e c t o r a l  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  ZBRD and I D A  new l o a n  commitments i n  
t h e  p a s t  f o r t y  y e a r s .  During t h e  two post-war d e c a d e s ,  t h e  Bank l e n t  
ma in ly  f o r  e c o n m i c  r e c o v e r y .  Much l e n d i n g  invo lved  non-pro jec t  l o a n s  
t o  s t i m u l a t e  growth and r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  and t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  b a s i c  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  power, and i n d u s t r i a l  f a c i l i t i e s .  Lending f o r  a g r i -  
c u l t u r a l  development was q u i t e  l i m i t e d .  In  t h e  l a s t  twen ty  y e a r s ,  
though ,  a g r i c u l t u r e  h a s  become t h e  l a r g e s t  s i n g l e  s e c t o r  o f  World Bank 
a c t i v i t y .  The Bank h a s  a l s o  put an i n c r e a s i n g  emphasis  o n  t a r g e t i n g  
a i d  t o  needy peop le .  In p a r t ,  t h i s  h a s  meant an i n c r e a s e  i n  l e n d i n g  
i n  t h e  "human s e r v i c e s "  a r e a  and i n  l e n d i n g  f o r  smal l  s c a l e  i n d u s t r y .  
The Bank a l s o  c l a i m s  t h a t  a  major e f f o r t  h a s  been  made i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  
t o  d e s i g n  p r o j e c t s  -- w e n  p r o j e c t s  i n  t h e  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  a r e a  (com- 
m u n i c a t i o n s ,  i n d u s t r y ,  e n e r g y )  -- so t h e y  w i l l  t a r g e t  more b e n e f i t s  t o  
t h e  poorer  people  i n  t h e  borrower c o u n t r y .  
A t  t h e  same t i m e ,  however,  t h e  World Bank h a s  a l s o  s t a r t e d  l o o k -  
i n g  h a r d e r  a t  economic p o l i c y  i s s u e s .  In t h e  p r o c e s s ,  i t  h a s  r e p o r t -  
e d l y  made i t s  l o a n s  more c o n t i n g e n t  on t h e  p o l i c y  re fo rms  under taken  
by t h e  borrower c o u n t r y .  The Bank h a s  a l l o c a t e d  an i n c r e a s e d  p o r t i o n  
of  I B R D  and I D A  r e s o u r c e s  f o r  b r o a d - s c a l e  m u l t i - s e c t o r  l o a n s ,  p a r t i -  
c u l a r l y  s t r u c t u r a l  ad jus tment  l o a n s  des igned  t o  encourage economic 
p o l i c y  change i n  t h e  borrower  c o u n t r i e s .  It h a s  a l s o  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  
p o r t i o n  o f  s e c t o r  l e n d i n g  which i s  aimed a t  upgrading e f f i c i e n c y  and 
re fo rming  t h e  p o l i c y  environment  a f f e c t i n g  broad c a t e g o r i e s  o f  economic 
a c t i v i t y .  
Some c r i t i c s  -- p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h o s e  who t h i n k  d e v e l o p n e n t  f i n a n c e  
should  focus  m a i n l y  on t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  new p r o d u c t i v e  f a c i l i t i e s  
-- q u e s t i o n  whether the  Bank 's  new s t r e s s  o n  economic p o l i c y  re fo rm 
and a i d  to t h e  poor a r e  c o m p a t i b l e  wi th  t h e  b a s i c  w r k  o f  expanding 
economic c a p a c i t y .  Others  -- p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h o s e  who a r e  e s p e c i a l l y  
F i g u r e  8 .  IBRO and I D A  Loan Commitments 
by Sector  f o r  Four Per iods ,  1947-1985 
( m i l l i o n s  o f  US d o l l a r  e q u i v a l e n t )  
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concerned about t h e  h u m a n i t a r i a n  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  a i d  program -- ques- 
t i o n  whether the  Bank's  s t r e s s  o n  economic p o l i c y  re fo rm i s  c o m p a t i b l e  
wi th  t h e  g o a l  o f  t a r g e t i n g  i n c r e a s e d  b e n e f i t s  t o  t h e  poor .  Bank 
spokesmen contend t h a t  sound development r e q u i r e s  sound p o l i c y  and 
programs t o  h e l p  t h e  poor ,  n o t  mere ly  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  f a c i l i t i e s  
t o  expand p o t e n t i a l  o u t p u t .  They a l s o  s a y  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no i n t r i n s i c  
c o n f l i c t  between t h e  g o a l s  o f  sound p o l i c y  and h e l p  f o r  t h e  poor. I n  
many c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e y  s a y ,  t h e  poor w i l l  s u f f e r  most  i f  t h e i r  n a t i o n a l  
economies c o l l a p s e  because  of  poor economic p o l i c y  and f a i l u r e  t o  
a d j u s t  t o  world economic r e a l i t i e s .  
2 .  Types o f  World Bank Loans 
The World Bank h a s  v a r i o u s  t y p e s  o f  l o a n s  which i t  c a n  use  t o  
a c c a n p l i s h  d i f f e r e n t  deve lopnen t  g o a l s .  The l a r g e s t  c a t e g o r y  o f  l o a n s ,  - - 
s p e c i f i c  p r o j e c t  l o a n s ,  i n v b l v e s  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  f i n a n c e  f o r  s p e c i f i c  
i n v e s t m e n t s  o r  a c t i v i t i e s .  Th i s  c a t e g o r y  c o n s t i t u t e d  6 1  p e r c e n t  o f  
IBRD/IM l e n d i n g  i n  f i s c a l  1980 and 4 1  p e r c e n t  i n  1984. Disbursement 
may t a k e  4  t o  9  y e a r s  b e f o r e  t h e  p r o j e c t  i s  f u l l y  comple ted .  
The n e x t  l a r g e s t  c a t e g o r y  i n v o l v e s  l o a n s  f o r  s e c t o r  o p e r a t i o n s .  
These range  from a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t  a r e  o n l y  s l i g h t l y  b r o a d e r  i n  scope 
t h a n  s p e c i f i c  p r o j e c t s  t o  comprehensive ad jus tment  o p e r a t i o n s  t h a t  
i n v o l v e  t h e  e n t i r e  s e c t o r  o f  t h e  econany. S e c t o r  inves tment  and main- 
t e n a n c e  l o a n s ,  t h e  sub-group most s i m i l a r  t o  p r o j e c t  l e n d i n g ,  h a s  been  
a  growing focus f o r  Bank a c t i v i t y .  Th i s  t y p e  invo lved  some 27 p e r c e n t  
o f  IBRDIIDA l e n d i n g  i n  f i s c a l  1984,  canpared  t o  1 7  p e r c e n t  f o r  1980.  
Loans t o  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s ,  a n o t h e r  sub-group,  i s  a mechanism 
f o r  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  l o c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and f o r  c h a n n e l i n g  r e s o u r c e s  t o  
s p e c i f i c  k i n d s  o f  r e c i p i e n t s .  In f i s c a l  1984,  sane  1 3  p e r c e n t  o f  
I B R D I I D A  l e n d i n g  went t o  i n t e r m e d i a r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  canpared  w i t h  15  
p e r c e n t  i n  1980. S e c t o r  ad jus tment  l o a n s ,  aimed a t  f i n a n c i n g  t h e  b a s i c  
r e s t r u c t u r i n g  of economic a c t i v i t y  and p o l i c y  i n  s p e c i f i c  s e c t o r s  o f  
t h e  b o r r o w e r ' s  economy, h a s  been a  growing e f f o r t  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s .  I n  
f i s c a l  1984,  such  l o a n s  invo lved  about  9  p e r c e n t  o f  I B R D I I D A  l e n d i n g ,  
compared with 2 p e r c e n t  i n  1981. These l o a n s  f i n a n c e  impor t s  f o r  t h e  
s e c t o r ,  e i t h e r  w i t h  p r e - i d e n t i  f i e d  b e n e f i c i a r i e s  o r  agreed c r i t e r i a  f o r  
d i s t r i b u t i o n .  Disbursement c a n  be f a i r l y  r a p i d ,  over  1  t o  4  y e a r s  
depending on t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  
S t r u c t u r a l  ad jus tment  l o a n s  (SALs) focus  on economic reform and 
ad jus tment  i n  s e v e r a l  s e c t o r s .  Like s e c t o r  ad jus tment  l o a n s ,  t h e y  a l s o  
f i n a n c e  g e n e r a l  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  i m p o r t s ,  p r o v i d i n g  needed b a l a n c e  o f  pay- 
ments s u p p o r t  f o r  an econany i n  t r a n s i t i o n .  SALs aim a t  e f f e c t i n g  
changes  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  approach  t o  economic p o l i c y ,  f o r e i g n  exchange 
and e x t e r n a l  d e b t  management, and p a r a s t a t a l  (government-owned f i r m )  
o p e r a t i o n s .  Lending f o r  SALs invo lved  about  8  p e r c e n t  o f  I B R D I I D A  
l e n d i n g  i n  f i s c a l  1984,  canpared with 3 p e r c e n t  i n  1980. SALs c a n  b e  
q u i t e  f a s t  d i s b u r s i n g ,  w i t h  a  f u l l  payout o f  t h e  l o a n  i n  1  t o  3  y e a r s  
depending on t h e  s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n .  
T e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e  l o a n s .  These l o a n s  h e l p  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  cap- 
a c i t y  of  l o c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  p r e p a r e  development p o l i c i e s  and i n v e s t -  
m e n t s .  In p r i o r  y e a r s ,  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  e n g i n e e r i n g  a d v i c e  was t h e  
major e lement  of  t h i s  a i d .  More r e c e n t l y ,  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  of p o l i c y  
s k i l l s  and b roader  economic a d v i c e  have been t h e  main f o c u s .  Th i s  
t y p e  o f  a i d  i s  used p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  A f r i c a ,  where t h e  s h o r t a g e  o f  
q u a l i f i e d  managers and t e c h n i c i a n s  i s  e s p e c i a l  1 y  a c u t e .  Of t e n ,  t h e  
World Bank l e n d s  t h e  borrower  c o u n t r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n  an exper ienced 
member o f  i t s  own s t a f f  and c h a r g e s  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  c o s t s  a g a i n s t  t h e  
l o a n .  In  o t h e r  c a s e s ,  t h e  l o a n  w i l l  f i n a n c e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  o u t s i d e  
c o n s u l t a n t  a d v i c e .  Disbursement u s u a l l y  t a k e s  2 t o  6 y e a r s .  
A s s i s t a n c e  f o r  emergency r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  i s  a l s o  sometimes made 
a v a i l a b l e  t o  h e l p  bor rowers  cope wi th  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  n a t u r a l  o r  o t h e r  
d i s a s t e r s .  Postwar r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  was t h e  major focus  of  World Bank 
l e n d i n g  i n  Europe and A s i a ,  f o r  example,  d u r i n g  t h e  e a r l y  y e a r s  o f  
t h e  Bank. R e c o n s t r u c t i o n  l o a n s  a r e  s t i l l  an  impor tan t  i n s t r u m e n t  f o r  
World Bank a i d  i n  s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  amounts l e n t  f o r  
t h i s  purpose  w i l l  depend on t h e  number and t h e  scope o f  t h e  d i s a s t e r s .  
Bank a i d  may sometimes f i n a n c e  t h e  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  s p e c i f i c  f a c i l -  
i t i e s .  More o f t e n ,  i t  f i n a n c e s  t h e  i m p o r t a t i o n  o f  a  broad r a n g e  o f  
goods needed a s  imputs  f o r  t h e  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  p r o c e s s .  F u l l  d i s b u r s e -  
ment c a n  t a k e  from 1  t o  4 y e a r s .  In f i s c a l  1984, t h e  sank f inanced  
o n l y  o n e  such l o a n ,  whereas  i t  f inanced  12  i n  f i s c a l  years  1980-1981. 
' Ques t ion  12:  I 
How d o e s  t h e  World Bank d e c i d e  what l o a n s  t o  make? 1 
How d o e s  i t  p r e p a r e  and moni to r  i t s  loans?  I 
How d o e s  i t  know i t s  funds a r e  b e i n g  used f o r  t h e i r  I 
i n t e n d e d  purposes? I 
I 
- - 
1. S e t t i n g  P r i o r i t i e s  
The World Bank's A r t i c l e s  o f  Agreement s p e c i f y  t h a t ,  i n  i t s  lend-  
i n g  program, t h e  "most u s e f u l  and urgent  p r o j e c t s  w i l l  b e  d e a l t  wi th  
f i r s t  ." The Bank klorks c l o s e l y  wi th  t h e  r e c i p i e n t  government i n  s e t -  
t i n g  p r i o r i t i e s  f o r  e a c h  c o u n t r y .  The Bank w i l l  n o t  make a  l o a n  o v e r  
t h e  borrower  c o u n t r y ' s  o b j e c t i o n ,  s i n c e  t h e  Bank r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  gov- 
ernment g u a r a n t e e  t h e  repayment o f  a l l  l o a n s  made t o  e n t i t i e s  w i t h i n  
i t s  t e r r i t o r y .  Thus, t h e  borrower government ' s  g o a l s  and p l a n s  c a n  
have a  major impact on t h e  p r i o r i t i e s  and t h e  shape o f  Bank l e n d i n g  
i n  a  s p e c i f i c  c o u n t r y .  There  i s  a  g r e a t  d e a l  of  d i v e r s i t y  among t h e  
Bank 's  bor rowers  i n  terms o f  t h e i r  a s s e t s ,  l e v e l s  o f  development ,  soc- 
i o c u l t u r a l  p a t t e r n s ,  and p o l i t i c a l  sys tems .  The Bank's  r o l e  i s  m a i n l y  
o n e  of p rov id ing  p r o f e s s i o n a l  adv ice  and s u p p o r t  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  b o r -  
r o w e r ' s  needs .  The Bank's  p r i o r i t i e s ,  however,  a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
t h o s e  o f  t h e  borrower  c o u n t r y  government.  Through i t s  own c o u n t r y  
economic and s e c t o r  work and i t s  d i a l o g  w i t h  t h e  bor rower ,  t h e  Bank 
d e v e l o p s  i t s  own assessment  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  needs  and development 
p r i o r i t i e s .  In  some c a s e s ,  s o u r c e s  r e p o r t ,  t h e  Bank may s e e k  t o  pur- 
suade  a  r e l u c t a n t  government t o  g i v e  c e r t a i n  g o a l s  and p r o j e c t s  more 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  and h i g h e r  p r i o r i t y .  Ln o t h e r  c a s e s ,  t h e  Bank may r e j e c t  
government-sponsored p r o p o s a l s ,  o r  a l l o w  them t o  l a n g u i s h ,  i f  t h e  
Bank c o n s i d e r s  them i n a p p r o p r i a t e  o r  c o n t r a r y  t o  i t s  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  
c o u n t r y ' s  n e e d s .  When t h e  Bank and t h e  bor rower  government d i s a g r e e  
about p r i o r i t i e s ,  s o u r c e s  r e p o r t ,  t h e  l e v e l  of  Bank l e n d i n g  w i l l  gen- 
e r a l l y  d e c l i n e .  
3 .  P r o d u c t i v e  Use 
The World Bank's  A r t i c l e s  o f  Agreement s t a t e  t h a t  t h e  Bank s h a l l  
provide  f i n a n c e  " f o r  p r o d u c t i v e  purposes  ." Consequent ly ,  t h e  Bank 
l e n d s  o n l y  f o r  new p r o g r m s  o r  p r o j e c t s  o r  f o r  i n c r e a s e s  i n  an e x i s t -  
i n g  o p e r a t i o n .  It d o e s  n o t  r e f i n a n c e  e x i s t i n g  l o a n s  o r  make l o a n s  f o r  
g e n e r a l  g o v e r m e n t  e x p e n s e s .  L ikewise ,  i t  d o e s  n o t  lend f o r  consump- 
t i o n  ( f o r  example, p u r c h a s e s  o f  food) o r  f o r  s t r a i g h t  b a l a n c e  of pay- 
ments  s u p p o r t .  S e v e r a l  s p e c i f i c  i s s u e s  should  be n o t e d ,  however.  
F i r s t ,  t h e  borrower  c o u n t r y ' s  own economic p o l i c i e s  c a n  have a  
major  impact on t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and p r o d u c t i v e n e s s  o f  World Bank 
l o a n s ,  Even i f  a  Bank l o a n  i s  t e c h n i c a l l y  and economica l ly  sound,  i t  
can b e  undercut  by g o v e r m e n t  p o l i c i e s  i n  r e l a t e d  a r e a s .  A Bank a g r i -  
c u l t u r e  p r o j e c t  might f a i l  t o  a c h i e v e  i t s  g o a l s ,  f o r  example,  b e c a u s e  
o f f i c i a l  p r i c e  c o n t r o l s  t a k e  away t h e  i n c e n t i v e  t o  produce o r  because  
o t h e r  government p o l i c i e s  c a n p l i c a t e  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  A l s o ,  b e c a u s e  o f  
t h e  f u n g i b i l i t y  o f  money, t h e r e  i s  sometimes a  q u e s t i o n  whether t h e  
Bank i s  f i n a n c i n g  t h e  p r o j e c t  i t  approves  o r  some o t h e r  a c t i v i t y  t h e  
borrower c o u n t r y  i s  u n d e r t a k i n g .  When, f o r  example,  t h e  Bank f u n d s  
a  p r i o r i t y  p r o j e c t  t h a t  t h e  government might have f i n a n c e d  with i t s  
own money, t h e  Bank l o a n  f r e e s  t h e  government ' s  r e s o u r c e s  f o r  some 
o t h e r  use .  I f  t h e  borrower u s e s  t h o s e  r e s o u r c e s  f o r  a  development  
p r o j e c t  o r  some o t h e r  sound i n v e s t m e n t ,  t h e  Bank l o a n  will have been  
used p r o d u c t i v e l y .  I f  t h e  borrower  u s e s  i t s  funds  f o r  w a s t e f u l  show- 
c a s e  p r o j e c t s  o r  some o t h e r  unsound p u r p o s e s ,  however,  t h e  Bank l o a n  
may have had a  l e s s  p r o d u c t i v e  e f f e c t .  
Second, t h e  World Bank i s  m a i n l y  a  p r o j e c t  l e n d e r  b u t ,  a s  no ted  
b e f o r e ,  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  amount o f  l e n d i n g  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  h a s  gone f o r  
s t r u c t u r a l  ad jus tment  l o a n s ,  broad s e c t o r  l o a n s ,  and o t h e r  s i m i l a r  
t y p e s  o f  non-pro jec t  a i d .  These l o a n s  a l l  aim a t  promoting economic 
reform i n  t h e  b o r r o w r  c o u n t r y  by  f i n a n c i n g  a  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  
import  b i l l ,  and t h u s  h e l p i n g  underg i rd  t h e  econamy whi le  t h e  govern- 
ment moves ( i n  accordance  w i t h  commitments i t  makes t o  t h e  Bank) t o  
r e s t r u c t u r e  i t s  economic sys tem and make b a s i c  a d j u s t m e n t s  i n  economic 
p o l i c y .  Whether the  non-pro jec t  l o a n  i s  u l t i m a t e l y  a  " p r o d u c t i v e  pur- 
pose" w i l l  depend on whether t h e  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy 
o r  t h e  s e c t o r  proves  f r u i t f u l  and whether t h e  needed economic p o l i c y  
r e f o r m s  t a k e  p l a c e .  
The Bank c o n t e n d s  t h a t ,  i n  i t s  p o l i c y  d i a l o g s  wi th  borrower  coun- 
t r i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t i o n  i s  paid  t o  economic p o l i c y  and t h e  use  t o  
which t h e  c o u n t r y  p u t s  i t s  own r e s o u r c e s .  Sources  s a y  t h a t  t h e  Bank's  
p r o j e c t  s e l e c t i o n  p r o c e s s  and i t s  l o a n  l e v e l s  a r e  s t r o n g l y  i n f l u e n c e d  
by t h e  Bank 's  c o n c l u s i o n s  about  whether t h e  borrower  i s  making produc- 
t i v e  use  o f  i t s  own f u n d s .  P a r t i c u l a r l y  with s t r u c t u r a l  a d j u s t m e n t  
and s e c t o r  l e n d i n g ,  t h e y  r e p o r t ,  t h e  economic s i t u a t i o n  and p o l i c y  
e n v i r o w e n t  a r e  c l o s e l y  s c r u t i n i z e d  and loan  d i s b u r s e m e n t s  may b e  sus- 
pended i f  t h e  Bank s t a f f  d e c i d e s  t h e  borrower  c o u n t r y  i s  n o t  h p l e -  
ment ing t h e  l o a n  agreement .  The Bank's c r i t i c s  c o n t e n d ,  however,  t h a t  
t h e  Bank i s  o f t e n  more i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t r a n s f e r r i n g  r e s o u r c e s  t o  develop- 
i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t h a n  i n  s p u r r i n g  p r o d u c t i v i t y  o r  promoting r e a l  p o l i c y  
reform.  The Bank may t a l k  about t h e  r i g o r  o f  i t s  p o l i c y  s c r u t i n y ,  b u t  
i n  t h e  e n d ,  t h e  c r i t i c s  s a y ,  i t  i s  more i n c l i n e d  toward making t h e  
money a v a i l a b l e  t h a n  toward s t o p p i n g  a l l  d i sbursements  and new lend-  
ing f o r  s p e c i f i c  c o u n t r i e s  u n t i l  governments a g r e e  t o  pursue sound 
economic p o l i c i e s .  Bank spokesmen a r g u e  t h a t  t h e i r  p o l i c y  r w i e w s  a r e  
meaningful  and l end ing  o r  d i s b u r s e m e n t s  a r e  sometimes suspended un ti1 
t h e  borrower  compl ies  wi th  t h e  l o a n  c o n d i t i o n s .  Bank o f f i c i a l s  admit  
t h e r e  a r e  l i m i t s  o n  what the  Bank c a n  do  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n s .  
They a r g u e ,  however,  t h a t  t h e  c r i t i c s  have u n r e a l i s t i c  i d e a s  about t h e  
Bank' s c a p a c i t y  f o r  promoting fundamental  changes i n  t h e  borrower '  s 
domest ic  s y s t a n  o r  f o r  making governments adopt t h e  Bank's economic 
p r i o r i t i e s .  They a l s o  n o t e  t h a t  o t h e r  c r i t i c s  say  t h e  World Bank i s  
too  s t r i n g e n t  and r e s t r i c t i v e  -- n o t  too e a s y  o r  p r o f l i g a t e  -- i n  i t s  
l e n d i n g  p r a c t i c e s .  Many o f  t h e s e  o t h e r  c r i t i c s  a r e  unhappy w i t h  t h e  
i n c r e a s e s  i n  c o n d i t i o n a l i t y .  Many a r e  a l s o  u p s e t  because  t h e  Bank's 
t o t a l  l o a n  volume f e l l  i n  1985 and because t h e  Bank l e n t  l e s s  than  i t  
cou ld  have i n  previous  y e a r s .  
3 .  The Loan Review P r o c e s s  
Even though t h e  World Bank u s u a l l y  makes o n l y  about  130 new ZBRD 
and 100 new I D A  l o a n  caamitments  a  y e a r ,  i t  may have a s  many a s  700 t o  
800 p r o j e c t s  under c o n s i d e r a t i o n  by t h e  s t a f f  a t  any one  t ime .  Depend- 
i n g  on i t s  c a n p l e x i t y ,  a  p r o j e c t  may t a k e  a s  long a s  s e v e r a l  y e a r s  o r  
a s  l i t t l e  a s  s e v e r a l  months b e f o r e  t h e  p r o j e c t  p roposa l  i s  ready  f o r  
p r e s e n t a t i o n  t o  t h e  Bank's Board of Execut ive  D i r e c t o r s  f o r  p o s s i b l e  
a  ppr ov a1 . 
P r o s p e c t i v e  l o a n s  proceed through a  s t a n d a r d  s e r i e s  o f  s t e p s  -- 
t h e  s o c a l l e d  p r o j e c t  c y c l e  -- a s  t h e y  undergo c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  In t h e  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  phase o f  t h e  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  Bank, t h e  n a t i o n a l  govern- 
m e n t ,  and t h e  borrower i n s t i t u t i o n  i d e n t i f y  h i g h - p r i o r i t y  p r o j e c t s  t h a t  
s u p p o r t  t h e  d e s i r e d  deve lopnen t  s t r a t e g y ,  meet s e c  t o t a l  o b j e c t i v e s  , and 
appear  s u i t a b l e  f o r  Bank s u p p o r t .  Next,  i n  t h e  p r o j e c t  p r e p a r a t i o n  
phase ,  t h e  borrower and Bank c l a r i f y  t h e  p r o j e c t ' s  g o a l s  and i d e n t i f y  
p o s s i b l e  t e c h n i c a l ,  economic , f i n a n c i a l  , and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i s s u e s .  
They u n d e r t a k e  f e a s i b i l i t y  s t u d i e s  t o  sharpen t h e  p l a n s ,  compare c o s t s  
and b e n e f i t s ,  and s t u d y  a l t e r n a t i v e  methods fo r  e f f e c t i n g  t h e  pro- 
j e c t .  During t h e  a p p r a i s a l  phase ,  s t a f f  m i s s i o n s  v i s i t  t h e  proposed 
p r o j e c t  t o  a s s e s s  i t s  t e c h n i c a l ,  economic,  f i n a n c i a l ,  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  - 
m e r i t s .  The m i s s i o n  then  recommends t h e  terms and c o n d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  
l o a n s  t h a t  a r e  chosen f o r  n e g o t i a t i o n .  During t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  phase ,  
t h e  Bank and t h e  borrower t r y  t o  a g r e e  on t h e  s t e p s  needed t o  c a r r y  
o u t  t h e  p r o j e c t .  Legal l o a n  documents a r e  d r a f t e d .  The Bank s a y s  
t h a t  a l l  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  i s s u e s  r a i s e d  p r i o r  t o  and d u r i n g  t h e  a p p r a i s a l  
s t a g e  a r e  d e a l t  wi th  i n  t h e  l o a n  document. Once t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  a r e  
c a n p l e t e d ,  t h e  loan  g o e s  t o  t h e  Bank P r e s i d e n t  and h i s  l o a n  rev iew com- 
m i t t e e  f o r  p o s s i b l e  a p p r o v a l .  I f  t h e  Bank's  t o p  l e a d e r s h i p  a g r e e s  
t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  l o a n ,  t h e  p roposa l  moves t o  t h e  Board of  E x e c u t i v e  
D i r e c t o r s  f o r  a p p r o v a l .  The 21 manbers o f  t h e  b a r d  of  E x e c u t i v e  
D i r e c t o r s  a r e  appo in ted  o r  e l e c t e d  by t h e  Bank's member c o u n t r i e s  and 
t h e y  speak  f o r  governments i n  o v e r s e e i n g  Bank o p e r a t i o n s .  Vot ing i s  
o n  a  weighted v o t e  b a s i s ,  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  each c o u n t r y ' s  s h a r e  i n  IBRD 
s u b s c r i p t i o n s  o r  I D A  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  The Execu t ive  D i r e c t o r s  (EDs) 
from t h e  advanced i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s  c o n t r o l  over  h a l f  t h e  v o t e s ,  
a l t h o u g h  a s  a  p r a c t i c a l  m a t t e r  t h e  Board u s u a l l y  o p e r a t e s  on a  con- 
s e n s u s  b a s i s  w i t h  l i t t l e  formal v o t i n g .  I f  t h e  EDs approve  t h e  pro- 
posed p r o j e c t ,  t h e  implementa t ion ,  s u p e r v i s i o n ,  and e v a l u a t i o n  s teps 
t a k e  p l a c e .  I h e  Bank u s u a l l y  p r o v i d e s  o n l y  p a r t i a l  funding of  t h e  
p r o j e c t  -- u s u a l l y  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange canponen t  o f  t h e  c o s t  -- whi le  
t h e  borrower o r  o t h e r  l e n d e r s  f i n a n c e  t h e  rest o f  t h e  c o s t .  Bank m i s -  
s i o n s  may v i s i t  t h e  p r o j e c t  f r e q u e n t l y  t o  oversee  i t s  implementa t ion  
and t o  make c e r t a i n  t h a t  t h e  borrower  a d h e r e s  t o  t h e  p l a n s ,  s c h e d u l e s ,  
and c o n d i t i o n s  embodied i n  t h e  l o a n  agreement .  
Once t h e  loan  i s  approved ,  t h e  World Bank opens  a  l i n e  o f  c r e d i t  
f o r  t h e  p r o j e c t  i n  t h e  b o r r o w e r ' s  name. The bor rower  d o e s  n o t  r e c e i v e  
t h e  p roceeds  o f  t h e  loan  a s  a  cash  t r a n s f e r  n o r  a r e  funds  d i s b u r s e d  
r i g h t  away. The Bank r u l e s  s a y  t h e  borrower  must  award a l l  c o n t r a c t s  
f o r  p rocur ing  t h e  goods and s e r v i c e s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  p r o j e c t s ' s  
implementa t ion on t h e  b a s i s  o f  l o w s t  e v a l u a t e d  b i d  (i . e . ,  l o w e s t  b i d  
by  a  c a n p e t e n t  b i d d e r  .) The borrower u n d e r t a k e s  t h e  implementa t ion  
o f  t h e  p r o j e c t  and t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r s .  Bank s t a f f  
i n s p e c t  p r o j e c t s ,  from t ime  t o  t i m e ,  a s  t h e y  a r e  implemented.  As t h e  
work goes  forward,  t h e  borrower  s e n d s  t h e  b i l l s  t o  t h e  World Bank. 
A f t e r  i t  checks  t o  b e  c e r t a i n  t h a t  a l l  t h e  r u l e s  and agreements  were  
f o l l o w e d ,  t h e  Bank d i s b u r s e s  t h e  f u n d s  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  o r  
r e i m b u r s e s  t h e  borrower f o r  any q u a l i f y i n g  payments t h e  bor rower  h a s  
a l r e a d y  made. 
I Ques t ion  13:  I 
I I 
I How much i n t e r e s t  d o e s  t h e  World Bank c h a r g e  f o r  i t s  Loans? I 
The World Bank c h a r g e s  bor rowers  one-hal f  o f  one p e r c e n t  more 
t h a n  i t s  own a v e r a g e  c o s t  o f  borrowing f o r  t h e  p r i o r  s i x  months .  
(Funds  borrowed b e f o r e  J u l y  1982 a r e  n o t  inc luded  i n  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n . )  
I n t e r e s t  i s  charged o n l y  o n  t h e  d i s b u r s e d  v a l u e  o f  l o a n s .  The Bank 
a 1  s o  l e v i e s  a  t h r e e - q u a r t e r s  o f  one p e r c e n t  canmi tment f e e  annua l1  y 
o n  t h e  und i sbursed  b a l a n c e  o f  l o a n s .  Between J a n u a r y  1982 and Jan-  
u a r y  1985, t o  b o l s t e r  i t s  own r e v e n u e s ,  t h e  Bank a l s o  charged  i t s  
b o r r o w r s  a  one-t ime f ront-end f e e  a t  t h e  t ime  t h e  l o a n  commitment 
was made. ( O r i g i n a l l y  s e t  a t  1 . 5  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  l o a n ,  
t h e  f ront-end f e e  was lowered t w i c e ,  t o  0 .75  p e r c e n t  and t h e n  t o  0 . 2 5  
p e r c e n t ,  b e f o r e  be ing  e l i m i n a t e d  i n  J a n u a r y  1985.)  
Before  J u l y  1982,  t h e  Bank's  l o a n  r a t e  was reviewed q u a r t e r l y  b u t  
t h e r e  was no set p e r i o d  f o r  r e v i s i o n s .  Bank l o a n s  e r e  a l l  f i x e d  
r a t e  and t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  was set  a t  t h e  t ime t h e  l o a n  canmitment was 
made. Bank l o a n s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  d i s b u r s e d  o n l y  a s  t h e  b i l l s  from t h e  
c o n t r a c t o r s  m r k i n g  on t h e  p r o j e c t  a r e  s u b m i t t e d .  It u s u a l l y  t a k e s  6 
t o  9 y e a r s  t o  d i s b u r s e  a  l o a n  f u l l y .  On t h e  a v e r a g e ,  a b o u t  5 p e r c e n t  
o f  t h e  proceeds  a r e  d i s b u r s e d  i n  t h e  f i r s t  year  and 6 5  p e r c e n t  i n  t h e  
nex t  fou r  y e a r s .  T h i s  made t h e  Bank v u l n e r a b l e ,  under  t h e  o l d  sys tem,  
t o  major  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s .  I f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  r o s e  s h a r p l y  
d u r i n g  t h e  pe r iod  between t h e  t ime o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  l o a n  cunmitment  and 
t h e  t ime t h e  Bank borrowed funds  with which t o  make t h e  d i s b u r s e m e n t ,  
t h e  Bank c o u l d  f i n d  i t s e l f  l e n d i n g  funds  f o r  a  lower i n t e r e s t  c h a r g e  
t h a n  it was paying f o r  t h e  money. 
T h e r e f o r e ,  i n  J u l y  1982, t h e  Bank i n s t i t u t e d  a  new sys tem of v a r -  
i a b l e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  The i n t e r e s t  c h a r g e  i s  no l o n g e r  set a t  t h e  
t i m e  t h e  l o a n  commitment i s  approved .  R a t h e r ,  t h e  Bank's  l o a n  i s  
a d j u s t e d  e v e r y  s i x  months ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  r e f l e c t  s h i f t s  i n  t h e  ave rage  
c o s t  o f  c u r r e n t  bo r rowings .  The v a r i a b l e  r a t e  system a p p l i e s  t o  a l l  
l o a n s  approved s i n c e  1982,  b e  t h e y  l o a n s  where d i s b u r s e m e n t s  a r e  s t i l l  
underway o r  l o a n s  which have been f u l l y  d i s b u r s e d .  F i g u r e  9 shows t h e  
l o a n  r a t e s  i n  e f f e c t  f o r  t h e  p a s t  s i x  y e a r s .  
The Bank c h a r g e s  i t s  bo r rower s  t h e  same i n t e r e s t  r a t e  r e g a r d l e s s  
o f  t h e  c u r r e n c i e s  i n  which l o a n s  a r e  d i s b u r s e d .  'Ihus, l o a n s  d i s b u r s e d  
m a i n l y  i n  c u r r e n c i e s  w i t h  h igher - than-average  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  ( e  .g . , 
most r e c e c t l y ,  d o l l a r s )  may b e  charged  a  r a t e  which i s  l e s s  t h a n  com- 
p a r a b l e  c h a r g e s  f o r  commercial l o a n s  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  same c u r r e n c i e s  . 
F igu re  9. World Bank Loan Rates, 
July 1980 t o  Present 
(percentages) 
A l y  Jan July Jan * July JMI Ally &I July JM Aly Jm 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
s Change a c t u a l l y  e f f e c t e d  in Sept 1981 
(Source :  World Bank annual  r e p o r t s  and In fo rma t ion  
and P u b l i c  A f f a i r s  Department) 
S i m i l a r l y ,  l o a n s  d i s b u r s e d  i n  c u r r e n c i e s  w i t h  below-average i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  may c o s t  t h e  World Bank borrower a h i g h e r  rate t h a n  s i m i l a r  com- 
m e r c i a l  l o a n s .  The borrower h a s  no c h o i c e  i n  t h e  c u r r e n c i e s  i n  which 
t h e  l o a n  is d i s b u r s e d .  
The borrower assumes t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange r i s k .  The borrower 
pays an  i n t e r e s t  charge  which i s  based on t h e  Bank's a v e r a g e  c o s t  o f  
c a p i t a l ,  however, n o t  on t h e  exchange r i s k  of t h e  c u r r e n c y  i t  r e c e i v e s .  
Thus, t h e r e  i s  c e r t a i n  amount o f  c r o s s - s u b s i d y  among t h e  bor rowers .  
Depending on t h e i r  l u c k  i n  g e t t i n g  d i s b u r s e m e n t s  i n  one c u r r e n c y  o r  
a n o t h e r ,  some c o u n t r i e s  f a c e  h i g h e r  -- whi le  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  f a c e  
lower -- exchange r a t e  r i s k s  on t h e i r  d i s b u r s e d  l o a n s ,  though t h e y  a l l  
pay t h e  same i n t e r e s t  rates. The s i t u a t i o n  may average  o u t  i n  t h e  
l o n g  run  i f  t h e  c u r r e n c y  mix f o r  t h e  borrowers '  s u c c e s s i v e  l o a n s  more 
c l o s e l y  approximates  t h e  p a t t e r n  f o r  t h e  Bank's o v e r a l l  bor rowings .  




How much money h a s  t h e  World Bank l e n t  t o  
communist c o u n t r i e s ?  
Seven communist c o u n t r i e s  a r e  members of t h e  World Bank and i t s  
a f f i l i a t e s :  China,  Hungary, Kampuchea, Laos,  Romania, Vietnam, and 
Yugoslavia .  The World Bank has  l e n t  them a t o t a l  of $10.536 b i l l i o n ,  
a p r o x i m a t e l y  9.4 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  money l e n t  by t h e  World Bank s i n c e  
t h e  IBRD and I D A  were c r e a t e d .  Table  4 shows t h e  amounts l e n t  t o  
each  communist c o u n t r y .  The sums were a l l  l e n t  s i n c e  t h e  communist 
regimes i n  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  took power. 
Table  3 .  World Bank Loans t o  Communist C o u n t r i e s ,  
Cumulative t o  1985 and 1981-85 
( m i l l i o n s  of d o l l a r s )  
Cumulative p z G G K - )  1981-5 Only 
I BRD I D A  T o t a l  I Country  1 IBRD IDA T o t a l  
$1,838.7 $1,176.2 $3,014.9 / China 1$1,738.7 $1,076.2 $2,814.9 
802.9 ----- 802.9 Hungary 802.9 ----- 802.9 ----- ----- ---a- I Kampuchea I ----- ----- ----- 
----- 53.2 53.2 Laos ----- 53.2 53.2 
2,184.3 ----- 2,184.3  / Romania 1 681.5 ----- 681.5 
6.1 47 .0  53.1 Vietnam 6.1 47 .O 53.1 
4,525.2 ----- 4,525.2 1 ~ u g o s l a v i a l  1,841.1 ----- 1,841.1  
Another $1.638 b i l l i o n  has  a l s o  been l e n t  t o  a second group  of 
c o u n t r i e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  Afghan is tan  ($230.1 m i l l i o n ) ,  E t h i o p i a  ($879.7 
m i l l i o n ) ,  Nicaragua ($293.6 m i l l i o n ) ,  Mozambique ($45.0 m i l l i o n ) ,  and 
South Yemen ($189.9 m i l l i o n )  -- c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  l e f t i s t  regimes t h a t  
r e c e n t l y  have been of f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  concern  t o  t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s .  
Most o f  t h e  funds  f o r  Afghan is tan ,  E t h i o p i a ,  and Nicaragua were l e n t  
b e f o r e  t h e i r  c u r r e n t  gOVemmentS took power* 
I Quest ion 15: I 
1 How s i m i l a r  i s  t h e  c o u n t r y  p a t t e r n  f o r  World Bank l e n d i n g  and 1 I U.S. b i l a t e r a l  economic a i d ?  I 
H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  t h e r e  i s  much s i m i l a r i t y  i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  p a t t e r n  of 
World Bank l e n d i n g  and U.S. b i l a t e r a l  economic a i d .  As t h e  l e f t -hand  
columns of Tab le  5 (nex t  page) i n d i c a t e ,  twelve c o u n t r i e s  -- I n d i a ,  
B r a z i l ,  I n d o n e s i a ,  Turkey,  Korea, Colombia, Yugoslavia ,  P a k i s t a n ,  
t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s ,  Egypt,  Bangladesh,  and Morocco -- have been among t h e  
t o p  20 r e c i p i e n t s  of World Bank and US economic a s s i s t a n c e  cumula t ive  
through 1985. 
I n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  a s  t h e  r ight-hand columns of t h e  t a b l e  show, 
t h e r e  has  a l s o  been a  major o v e r l a p  i n  t h e  p a t t e r n s  of U.S. and World 
Bank a i d .  Ten c o u n t r i e s  -- Egypt ,  P a k i s t a n ,  Turkey,  I n d i a ,  Bangladesh,  
t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s ,  Indones ia ,  Morocco, Peru ,  and Kenya -- a r e  among t h e  
t o p  20 r e c i p i e n t s  f o r  both  U.S. and World Bank a i d .  I n  t h e  p a s t  10 
y e a r s ,  however, t h e r e  has  been a  s h i f t  i n  t h e  b a s i c  purpose  and focus  
of U.S. f o r e i g n  a i d .  Except i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  I s r a e l ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  
no l o n g e r  p rov ides  s u b s t a n t i a l  amounts of economic a i d  t o  middle-income 
c o u n t r i e s .  I n s t e a d ,  t h e  U.S. t a r g e t s  t h e  bu lk  of i t s  a i d  e i t h e r  t o  
c o u n t r i e s  of s t r a t e g i c  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o r  t o  t h e  p o o r e s t  
deve lop ing  n a t i o n s .  The World Bank c o n t i n u e s ,  wi th  U.S. s u p p o r t ,  t o  
p rov ide  s u b s t a n t i a l  amounts of a i d  t o  c o u n t r i e s  -- such a s  B r a z i l ,  
Mexico, Korea, Yugoslavia  -- whose per  c a p i t a  income l e v e l s  a r e  t o o  
high t o  q u a l i f y  f o r  much U.S. economic a i d .  For s t r a t e g i c  and h i s -  
t o r i c  r e a s o n s ,  t h e  U.S. l i s t  i n c l u d e s  more L a t i n  American c o u n t r i e s  
t h a n  does  t h e  World Bank l i s t .  (Those c o u n t r i e s  a l s o  r e c e i v e  m u l t i -  
l a t e r a l  a s s i s t a n c e  from t h e  Inter-American Development Bank.) The 
World Bank l i s t  i n c l u d e s  s e v e r a l  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  -- Thai land ,  Colombia, 
and N i g e r i a  -- which have been s i g n i f i c a n t  r e c i p i e n t s  of U.S. b i l a t e r a l  
a i d .  It a l s o  i n c l u d e s  Mexico, a  c o u n t r y  which h a s  chosen ( f o r  domes t ic  
p o l i t i c a l  r e a s o n s )  n o t  t o  a c c e p t  b i l a t e r a l  a s s i s t a n c e  from t h e  United 
S t a t e s .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  World Bank l i s t  a l s o  i n c l u d e s  t h r e e  
communist c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  r e c e i v e  no U.S. a i d .  With two of t h e s e  -- 
China and Yugoslavia  -- t h e  United S t a t e s  has  c o o p e r a t i v e  r e l a t i o n s .  
I s r a e l ,  t h e  l a r g e s t  r e c i p i e n t  o f  U.S. a i d  i n  t h e  r e c e n t  p e r i o d ,  h a s  
achieved a l e v e l  of per  c a p i t a  income a t  which i t  i s  no l o n g e r  e l i -  





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CRS- 3 2 
I V .  U .  S  . PARTICIPATION I N  THE WORLD BANK 
/ Quest ion 16: -1 
How much have t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  and o t h e r  member c o u n t r i e s  
c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  World Bank and i t s  a f f i l i a t e s ?  
F i g u r e s  10 ,  11 ,  and 12 show t h e  s i z e ,  i n  c u r r e n t  d o l l a r s ,  f o r  t h e  
p a s t  IBRD and IFC c a p i t a l  i n c r e a s e s  and I D A  r ep len i shments  and t h e  
U.S. s h a r e  of  e a c h .  I n  t h e  c a s e  of  t h e  IBRD ( f i g u r e  111, t h e  U.S. 
s h a r e  of  t h e  Bank's  g e n e r a l  c a p i t a l  i n c r e a s e s  ( i n  1944, 1959,  and 
1981) h a s  d e c l i n e d  from 32 t o  20 p e r c e n t  of  t h e  t o t a l  whi le  t h e  U.S. 
p a r t i c i p a t e d  o n l y  m a r g i n a l l y  -- o r  n o t  a t  a l l  -- i n  t h e  s e l e c t i v e  
c a p i t a l  i n c r e a s e s  (1963 t o  1977) which were des igned  t o  a d j u s t  owner- 
s h i p  s h a r e s  a s  c o u n t r i e s  changed i n  economic power and new c o u n t r i e s  
j o i n e d  t h e  Bank. The U.S. s h a r e  i n  I D A  rep len i shments  h a s  d e c l i n e d  
o v e r  t h e  y e a r s ,  a s  f i g u r e  10 i n d i c a t e s ,  from 42 .5  p e r c e n t  i n  1960 t o  
F i g u r e  12. C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  IDA 
US S h a r e  i n  In i t ia l  IDA 
D c o n t r i b u t i o n  and i n  Each 
S u b s e q u e n t  R e p l e n i s h m e n t  I 
UY 10 T ~ U S C o n t r i b u t i o n s  
0 '  " '1 O t h e r  C o u n t r i e s '  
C o n t r i b u t i o n s  
Initial  IM 1 1963 IDA 2 1968 IDA 3 1971 IDA 4 1974 IDA 5 1977 IDA 6i1 IDA 7 1m 
IDA 19W 1901 








IDA 6 + 
Supplement 
IDA 7 



























Excludes 5120 million paid in 1972 and 5161 million paid In 1974 as maintenance 
of value payments follovlng devaluations of the dollar. 
+ IDA 6 plus $1.72 billion in additional resources contributed by ocher countries 
to supplement IDA'S 1984 operatione. U . S .  share in IDA 6 was 27 percent. 
5 Subsequently raised to $942.9 million as other countries later jolned and 
made their initial IDA contributione. These additional contributions reduced 
the US share in the inltial IDA contribution to 33.9 percent. 
( s o u r c e :  World ~ a n k )  
F i g u r e  2 .  S u b s c r i p t i o n s  t o  IBRD C a p i t a l ,  1944-81 
US Share o f  I n i t i a l  and Each 
Subsequent C a p i t a l  I nc rease  
US C a l l a b l e  
US P a i d - i n  
non-US C a l l a b l e  
non-US P a i d - i n  
1944-6 1959 1963 1965 1970 i9n 1981 
Initial Increase Increase Increase Increase Increase Increase 
I n i t i a l  S u b s c r i p t i o n  
G e n e r a l  I n c r e a s e  
S e l e c t i v e  I n c r e a s e  
S e l e c t i v e  I n c r e a s e  
S e l e c t i v e  I n c r e a s e  
S e l e c t i v e  I n c r e a s e  
G e n e r a l  I n c r e a s e  
S e l e c t i v e  I n c r e a s e  
T o t a l  S i z e  
$7.67 b i l l i o n  § 
11.00 b i l l i o n  
1.00 b i l l i o n  
2.00 b i l l i o n  
3.00 b i l l i o n  
8.40 b i l l i o n  
40 .OO b i l l i o n  
4.00 b i l l i o n  
P r o p o r t i o n  
C a l l a b l e  
90 p e r c e n t  
100 p e r c e n t  
9 0  p e r c e n t  
90 p e r c e n t  
90 p e r c e n t  
90 p e r c e n t  
92.5 p e r c e n t  
100 p e r c e n t  
U.S. S u b s c r i p t i o n  U.S. S h a r e  
$3.175 b i l l i o n  41.4 p e r c e n t  
3.175 b i l l i o n  28.9 p e r c e n t  
0.0 0.0 p e r c e n t  
0.0 0.0 p e r c e n t  
0.246 b i l l i o n  + 8.2  p e r c e n t  
1.570 b i l l i o n  18.7 p e r c e n t  
8.777 b i l l i o n  21.9 p e r c e n t  
0.030 b i l l i o n  0.8 p e r c e n t  
Excludes  $560 m i l l i o n  ($51 m i l l i o n  o f  i t  pa id  i n )  subscribed i n  1972 and $774 m i l l i o n  
($71 m i l l i o n  of  i t  p a i d  i n )  s u b c r i b e d  i n  1974 a s  main tenance  of  v a l u e  payments fo l low-  
i n g  d e v a l u a t i o n s  of t h e  d o l l a r .  
+ As o n l y  h a l f  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  f u n d s  e r e  a p p r o p r i a t e d ,  t h e  US s u b s c r i b e d  t o  o n l y  h a l f  t h e  
s h a r e s  v h i c h  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  was a l lowed t o  s u b s c r i b e  under t e r n s  of  t h e  1970 IBm 
c a p i t a l  i n c r e a s e  agreement .  
S u b s e q u e n t l y  r a i s e d  t o  $10.0 b i l l i o n  a s  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  j o i n e d  and s u b s c r i b e d  t h e i r  
i n i t i a l  c a p i t a l .  These a d d i t i o n a l  s u b s c r i p t i o n s  reduced t h e  US s h a r e  i n  t h e  i n i t i a l  
IBRD s u b s c r i p t i o n  t o  31.8 p e r c e n t .  
F i g u r e  11. S u b s c r i p t i o n s  t o  IFC 
* 1955 1977 1985 
Initial Increase Increase 
= US Share o f  I n i t i  
and Each 
Subsequent IFC 
C a p i t a l  I n c r e a s e  
a US S u b s c r i p t i o n s  
Other C o u n t r i e s  ' 
S u b s c r i p t  i o n s  
T o t a l  S i z e  U.S. S u b s c r i p t ~ o n  U.S. Share  
1955 I n i t i a l  $ 7 8 . 3  m i l l i o n  S $ 3 5 . 2  m i l l l o n  4 5 . 0  p e r c e n t  
1977 I n c r e a s e  6 5 0 . 0  m i l l i o n  111.5 m i l l i o n  1 7 . 2  p e r c e n t  
1985 I n c r e a s e  650.0  m i l l i o n  175.2  m i l l i o n  2 7 . 0  p e r c e n t  
* In  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  funds  o b t a i n e d  through c o u n t r y  a u b r c r i p t l o n a ,  t h e  IPC 
had borrowed $ 1 . 1 7  b i l l l o n  from t h e  IBRD a s  of  June  30 ,  1985. 
4 S u b s e q u e n t l y  r a i s e d  t o  $100 m i l l i o n  a s  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  jorned  and 
s u b a c r l b e d  t h e i r  i n i t i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  These a d d i t i o n a l  s u b s c r i p t i o n s  
reduced t h e  US s h a r e  of t h e  l n i t i a i  r u b s c r i p c i u n  t o  3 5 . 2  p e r c e n t .  
25  p e r c e n t  i n  1985. The lowered U.S. s h a r e  o f  t h e  I D A  s i x t h  r e p l e n -  
i shment  (IDA 6 )  i s  due t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  d e c i d e d  t o  
make i t s  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  over four  y e a r s ,  while t h e  o t h e r  I D A  d o n o r s  
adhered t o  t h e  o r i g i n a l  t h r e e  year  schedu le .  The o t h e r  donor  coun- 
t r i e s  then  agreed t o  provide  a d d i t i o n a l  money, over  and above t h e i r  
o r i g i n a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  s o  IDA would have enough r e s o u r c e s  t o  con- 
t i n u e  i t s  r e g u l a r  l e n d i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  d u r i n g  t h a t  f o u r t h  yea r .  
1 Q u e s t i o n  17: I 
I I 
1 How d o e s  t h e  United S t a t e s  make p o l i c y  towards  t h e  I 
I World Bank? I 
1. E x e c u t i v e  Branch 
The Treasury  Lkpartment h a s  t h e  l e a d  r o l e  i n  the  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
a s  r e g a r d s  U.S. p o l i c y  towards t h e  World Bank. By e x e c u t i v e  o r d e r ,  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  h a s  d e l e g a t e d  t o  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  Treasury  h i s  auth-  
o r i t y  under law t o  i n s t r u c t  t h e  U.S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  t o  t h e  i n t e r n a -  
t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  . With in  t h e  Treasury  Department,  t h e  
A s s i s t a n t  S e c r e t a r y  f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s  manages U.S. p a r t i c i p a -  
t i o n  i n  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks.  
Other  a g e n c i e s  a r e  a l s o  i n v o l v e d ,  however,  i n  d i r e c t i n g  U. S. 
p o l i c y  towards  t h e  banks .  The Execu t ive  Branch normal ly  works o u t  
i t s  p o l i c y  th rough  a  formal i n t e r a g e n c y  committee p r o c e s s .  ' h i s  
g i v e s  o t h e r  d e p a r t m e n t s  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  t o  speak  t o  MDB i s s u e s  which 
e f f e c t  o r  c o n c e r n  them. A t  p r e s e n t ,  t h e  Working Group on Mult i -  
l a t e r a l  A s s i s t a n c e  (WGMA) i s  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  ins t rument  f o r  c o o r d i n a t -  
ing i n t e r a g e n c y  views on upcaning l o a n s  and o t h e r  o p e r a t i o n a l  o r  p o l i c y  
i s s u e s .  Another p a n e l ,  t h e  Na t iona l  Advisory Council  on I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Monetary and F i n a n c i a l  P o l i c i e s  (NAC) , i s  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  forum f o r  
c o o r d i n a t i n g  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  a s p e c t s  o f  MDB i s s u e s .  (Before  t h e  WGMA was 
c r e a t e d  i n  1979, t h e  NAC was t h e  main v e h i c l e  f o r  c o o r d i n a t i n g  a l l  
a s p e c t s  of U.S. p o l i c y  towards  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks . )  
While t h e  Treasury  h a s  t h e  l e a d i n g  r o l e  i n  t h e  i n t e r a g e n c y  MDB 
p o l i c y  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  S t a t e  Department i s  a l s o  a  major f o r c e  by v i r t u e  
o f  i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  U.S. f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  and i t s  knowledge 
about  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a f f a i r s .  The Agency f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Develop- 
ment and t h e  F e d e r a l  Reserve Board a r e  a l s o  impor tan t  p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  
by v i r t u e  o f  t h e i r  s p e c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  a r e a s  o f  i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  development and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y .  Other  par- 
t i c i p a  t i n g  a g e n c i e s  -- t h e  A g r i c u l t u r e  and Commerce Department s  and 
t h e  Export-Import  Bank, f o r  example -- have a  more l i m i t e d  r o l e  i n  
t h e  p rocess .  The i r  i n f l u e n c e  i s  g e n e r a l l y  p r e s c r i b e d  by t h e  s p h e r e  
o f  t h e i r  own i n s t i t u t i o n a l  concerns  and t h e  ways MDB a c t i v i t i e s  
i n f l u e n c e  t h e i r  own o p e r a t i o n s .  
2 .  Congress 
Congress  h a s  had a  m a j o r  r o l e ,  o v e r  t h e  y e a r s ,  i n  t h e  formula- 
t i o n  of U. S. p o l i c y  towards t h e  World Bank and t h e  o t h e r  m u l t i l a t -  
e r a l  development a g e n c i e s .  Unless  Congress p a s s e s  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  laws 
t o  a u t h o r i z e  U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  m u l t i l a t e r a l  bank fund ing  p l a n s  
and t o  a p p r o p r i a t e  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  f u n d s ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  can  n e i t h e r  
j o i n  t h e s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  nor  make c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o r  s u b s c r i p t i o n s  t o  
them. Fur the rmore ,  from t i m e  t o  t i m e ,  Congress h a s  e n a c t e d  r e q u i r e -  
ments i n  i t s  a u t h o r i z a t i o n  and a p p r o p r i a t i o n  a c t s ,  r e q u i r i n g  t h e  U.S. 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a t  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks t o  v o t e  i n  c e r t a i n  ways o r  
d i r e c t i n g  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t o  t a k e  c e r t a i n  a c t i o n s  towards  t h e  M D B s .  
L e a d e r s h i p  and o v e r s i g h t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o n  MDB l e g i s l a t i v e  
m a t t e r s  i s  d i f f u s e d  w i t h i n  Congress.  The Sena te  Fore ign  R e l a t i o n s  
Committee and t h e  House Banking Committee have t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
managing MDB a u t h o r i z i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  whi le  t h e  Fore ign  O p e r a t i o n s  
A p p r o p r i a t i o n s  Subcommittees o f  t h e  House and Senate  A p p r o p r i a t i o n s  
Canmi t t e e s  hand le  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  l e g i s l a t i o n .  Given t h e  i n c r e a s e d  
r o l e  t h e  budge ta ry  p r o c e s s  h a s  had on c o n g r e s s i o n a l  p r o c e d u r e s  i n  
r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  t h e  House and Senate  Budget Committees have a l s o  played 
a  key r o l e  i n  s p e c i f y i n g  o v e r a l l  budget  g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  t h e  MDB program. 
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H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  has  played a  l e a d i n g  r o l e  i n  t h e  
m u l t i l a t e r a l  development banks .  It was i n s t r u m e n t a l  i n  t h e  e s t a b l i s h -  
ment o f  t h e  World Bank and i n  t h e  expans ion  o f  m u l t i l a t e r a l  deve lop-  
ment banks '  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s .  Over t h e  y e a r s ,  U.S. l e a d e r s  have 
c la imed t h a t  t h r e e  b a s i c  c o n c e r n s  were se rved  by a c t i v e  U. S. p a r t i c i -  
p a t i o n  i n  t h e  banks .  F i r s t ,  t h e y  s a i d ,  h u m a n i t a r i a n  and development 
g o a l s  were served th rough  expans ion  o f  t h e  MDB programs. Second, t h e y  
a r g u e d ,  U.S. economic and f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  were se rved  th rough  t h e  
t r a d e  t h e s e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a g e n c i e s  g e n e r a t e d  and t h r o u g h  t h e i r  s t a b i l -  
i z i n g  i n f l u e n c e  o n  t h e  world economy. T h i r d ,  t h e y  s t a t e d ,  fundamental  
U. S. n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  and d i p l o m a t i c  g o a l s  were se rved  a s  t h e  MDBs '  
p r m o t e d  development and channeled r e s o u r c e s  t o  c o u n t r i e s  o f  f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  t h e  United S t a t e s .  
A t  t h e  same t ime t h a t  many were seek ing  t o  expand t h e  s i z e  and 
impact o f  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  development b a n k s ,  however, t h e r e  was a l s o  
a  growing r e s i s t a n c e  i n  o t h e r  q u a r t e r s  o f  t h e  U.S. p o l i t i c a l  s c e n e .  
C r i t i c s  ma in ta ined  t h a t  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  MDB a i d  d i v e r t e d  r e s o u r c e s  
away f r m  b i l a t e r a l  programs where t h e  impact on U.S. f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
g o a l s  migh t  b e  more d i r e c t  and p a l p a b l e .  C r i t i c s  w r r i e d  t h a t  t h e  
donor c o u n t r i e s  cou ld  no t  c o n t r o l  t h e  way t h e  MDBs used t h e i r  funds  
and t h a t ,  on some o c c a s i o n s ,  t h e  MDBs made l o a n s  t o  c o u n t r i e s  with 
which t h e  United S t a t e s  had s e r i o u s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  d i s p u t e s .  C r i t i c s  
a l s o  d i s l i k e d  many o f  t h e  economic p o l i c i e s  pursued by t h e  World Bank 
and the  o t h e r  m u l t i l a t e r a l  a g e n c i e s ,  o n  t h e  grounds  t h a t  t h e y  b e l i e v e d  
t h e s e  p o l i c i e s  promoted s t a t e  domina t ion  o f  deve lop ing  c o u n t r i e s '  
economies and e x c e s s i v e  a n p h a s i s  on income r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  r a t h e r  than 
g rowth .  
In 1980, c a n d i d a t e  Ronald Reagan campaigned a g a i n s t  t h e  growing 
s i z e  o f  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  bank program. The 1980 Republican p a r t y  
p l a t f o r m  s t r e s s e d  t h e  v a l u e  o f  b i l a t e r a l  r a t h e r  than  m u l t i l a t e r a l  a i d .  
"A Republican A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  w i l l  emphasize b i l a t e r a l  a s s i s t a n c e  pro- 
grams whenever p o s s i b l e , "  i t  s a i d .  " B i l a t e r a l  programs p rov ide  t h e  
b e s t  a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  a i d  programs w i l l  be f u l l y  accoun tab le  t o  t h e  
American t axpayer  and whol ly  c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  our  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  i n t e r -  
e s t s  ." The Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n f  s own t r a n s i t i o n  team f o r  i n t e r n a -  
t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  d e l i v e r e d  a  r e p o r t  t o  t h e  new S t a t e  
Department l e a d e r s h i p  i n  January which c r i t i c i z e d  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  
a g e n c i e s  and s t r o n g l y  d i scouraged  f u r t h e r  U.S. s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  MDB 
program. A f t e r  t a k i n g  o f f i c e ,  t h e  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  dec ided  t o  
g i v e  i t s  s u p p o r t  t o  t h e  enactment  o f  a  package o f  World Bank funding 
a u t h o r i z a t i o n s ,  n o t a b l y  U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  a  doub l ing  of I B R D  cap- 
i t a l  s t o c k  and i n  t h e  s i x t h  rep len i shment  of  IDA r e s o u r c e s .  During 
t h e  subsequen t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  a  seven th  rep len i shment  o f  t h e  I D A ,  
t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  pursuaded t h e  o t h e r  donors  t o  s u p p o r t  a  much s m a l l e r  
r e p l e n i s h m e n t  ($9 b i l l i o n  over t h r e e  y e a r s ,  which t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
s a i d  was t h e  maximm i t  cou ld  s u p p o r t ,  compared t o  t h e  $16 b i l l i o n  
recanmended by t h e  World Bank and t h e  $12 b i l l i o n  endorsed by t h e  Eur- 
opean donors )  than  they might  o t h e r w i s e  have p r e f e r r e d .  In i t s  p u b l i c  
announcements and i t s  own i n t e r n a l  p lanning documents,  t h e  Administra-  
t i o n  seemed t o  r e s e r v e  judgment on f u t u r e  U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  
World Bank and t h e  o t h e r  a g e n c i e s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  
t o o k  a n  a c t i v e  r o l e  i n  MDB a f f a i r s  d u r i n g  t h i s  pe r iod  and t h e  Reagan 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  made many s t a t e m e n t s  e x p r e s s i n g  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  work 
and t h e  g o a l s  o f  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks .  
At t h e  1985 annual  meeting of  t h e  World Bank and IMF i n  Seoul ,  
t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  announced a  s h i f t  i n  i t s  p o s t u r e  towards t h e  m u l t i -  
l a t e r a l  deve lopnen t  banks .  Treasury  S e c r e t a r y  Baker o u t l i n e d  a  p lan  
whereby t h e  World Bank m u l d  t ake  t h e  l ead  i n  managing a  c o o r d i n a t e d  
response  t o  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d e b t  c r i s i s .  P r e v i o u s l y ,  t h e  Administra-  
t i o n  had focused on t h e  IMF a s  t h e  main i n t e r n a t i o n a l  v e h i c l e  f o r  d e a l -  
i n g  wi th  deve lop ing  c o u n t r y  d e b t  problems. The Baker p l a n  c a l l e d  f o r  
a  $20 b i l l i o n  i n c r e a s e  i n  l end ing  by t h e  World Bank and t h e  I n t e r -  
American Development Bank, i n  1986-9. It a l s o  env i s ioned  a  c o r r e s -  
ponding $20 b i l l i o n  i n c r e a s e  i n  commercial bank l o a n s  t o  t h e  d e b t o r  
c o u n t r i e s  and a  c o n c e r t e d  World Bank e f f o r t  t o  encourage economic 
p o l i c y  reform i n  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s .  Baker d i d  no t  i n d i c a t e  whether t h e  
United S t a t e s  would s u p p o r t  an i n c r e a s e  i n  World Bank c a p i t a l  s t o c k  t o  
back  t h i s  i n c r e a s e d  I B R D  l e n d i n g ,  though many a n a l y s t s  b e l i e v e  a  cap- 
i t a l  s t o c k  i n c r e a s e  i s  i n e v i t a b l e .  The Treasury Department d i d  s i g n a l ,  
though,  i n  i t s  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  wi th  Congress ,  t h a t  i t  was w i l l i n g  t o  sup- 
por t  a  $12 b i l l i o n  expans ion  o f  t h e  I D A  -- under c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
-- when n e x t  round of  I D A  r ep len i shment  t a l k s  began l a t e r  i n  1986. 
There seem t o  be  t h r e e  fundamental  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h i s  a p p a r e n t  
s h i f t  from re t renchment  t o  expans ion  a s  t h e  b a s i c  theme f o r  U.S. 
p o l i c y  towards  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks .  F i r s t ,  t h e  Reagan Admin i s t ra -  
t i o n  had accomplished i t s  g o a l  of  r educ ing  t h e  r e l a t i v e  s i z e  o f  t h e  
MDB program. The p r o p o r t i o n  of  U.S. f o r e i g n  economic a i d  g o i n g  t o  
m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks f e l l  from 25 p e r c e n t  i n  1980 t o  17 p e r c e n t  i n  t h e  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  1987 budget  r e q u e s t .  The amounts t a r g e t e d  f o r  b i l a t -  
e r a l  a i d  i n c r e a s e d  s u b s t a n t i a l l y .  
Second, t h e  growing s e r i o u s n e s s  o f  t h e  world d e b t  c r i s i s  engen- 
dered a  new i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The 
United S t a t e s  took  major  s t e p s  us ing  b i l a t e r a l  r e s o u r c e s  t o  h e l p  s h o r e  
up Mexico's  economy a f t e r  t h a t  c o u n t r y  exper ienced  n e a r  economic 
c o l l a p s e  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  bankrup t sy  i n  1982. When i t  became c l e a r  
t h a t  t h e  d e b t  c r i s i s  was more widespread and t h a t  i t  invo lved  a  h o s t  
o f  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  deve lop ing  world ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  f i n a l l y  a g r e e d  
wi th  t h e  o t h e r  developed c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  c o n c e r t e d  a c t i o n  should  b e  
t a k e n  through t h e  IMF t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h e  problem. Thus, i n  1983, t h e  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  n e g o t i a t e d  wi th  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  and pursuaded Congress  
t o  r a t i f y ,  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agreement which c a l l e d  f o r  a  $45  b i l l i o n  
i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  IMF's f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s .  Sane $8.4 b i l l i o n  of  t h a t  
was t o  c a n e  from t h e  United S t a t e s .  P e r s i s t e n t  c r i t i c i s m  of  t h e  terms 
o  f  t h e  PIF ' s  " re  sc  ue" packages 1 ed t o  a  r ec  ogni  t i o n ,  however , t h a t  
t h e  d e b t o r  c o u n t r i e s '  problems c o u l d  n o t  r e a l l y  b e  so lved  w i t h i n  t h e  
3 t o  5 year t i m e  p e r i o d s  normal f o r  MF a s s i s t a n c e  p l a n s .  A n a l y s t s  
i n s i d e  and o u t s i d e  o f  t h e  government came t o  a g r e e  t h a t  a  longer  time- 
frame was n e c e s s a r y ,  and t h a t  long-term growth ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  s h o r t -  
term a u s t e r i t y ,  had t o  b e  t h e  prime focus  o f  f u t u r e  a d j u s t m e n t  p l a n s .  
These c o n c e r n s  l e d  t o  a  new emphasis on t h e  World Bank, a s  i t  seemed 
t h e  more a p p r o r i a t e  body f o r  a  longterm endeavor  aimed a t  s t i m u l a t i n g  
p o l i c y  ad jus tment  and economic growth i n  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  m r l d .  
T h i r d ,  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  began t a k i n g  a  new i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  
World Bank b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  Bank's  new emphasis on t h e  need f o r  economic 
p o l i c y  reform and more r e l i a n c e  o n  marke t  economic p r i n c i p l e s  i n  d e v e l -  
op ing  c o u n t r i e s .  Most a n a l y s t s  b e l i e v e  t h e  Bank's new emphasis o n  
p o l i c y  i s s u e s  and economic ad jus tment  was an  independent  a d a p t a t i o n  
s p u r r e d  by i t s  own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of w r l d  developments .  They n o t e  
t h a t  many o f  t h e  key a s p e c t s  o f  t h a t  p o l i c y  began t o  t a k e  shape i n  
1979 and 1980,  b e f o r e  t h e  c u r r e n t  U .  S. a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  took  o f f i c e .  
I n  any c a s e ,  t h e  World Bank's  new emphasis  o n  economic p o l i c y  i s s u e s  
-- and a l s o  i t s  s t r e s s  on t h e  need f o r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  needs  o f  t h e  
A f r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  -- para1 l e l e d  many o f  t h e  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n '  s 
own c o n c e r n s  i n  t h e s e  a r e a s .  These helped t o  make t h e  Bank more 
a c c e p t a b l e  t o  those  i n  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  who had p r e v i o u s l y  h a r b o r e d  
r e s e r v a t i o n s  when t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  t u r n e d  ( i n  1984-5) towards  t h e  i d e a  
o f  us ing t h e  Bank ( r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  Fund) a s  t h e  fu lcrum of a  new 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t r a t e g y  t o  cope wi th  t h e  problems of Third World d e b t .  
